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SUMMARY
The Internet of Things (IoT) has been considered to be the next industrial revolution.
Connecting physical objects to the internet and equipping things with the powerful data
analytic capabilities, the IoT will transform our everyday life from work to travel, leisure,
to entertainment. It is expected that by 2025 the number of connected devices will reach
100 billion with more than $11 trillion global economic impact. At the same time, the large
scale IoT deployment will be comprised of a huge number of interconnected and heteroge-
neous wireless and mobile devices, enabling continuous monitoring of activities and events
and happenings in our environments and our society. We argue that the large scale IoT de-
ployment demands privacy-aware big data systems and services that can deliver real-time
and life enhancing experiences while respecting both data privacy and user privacy. This
dissertation research contributes original ideas and innovative techniques in the context of
Internet of Things from three perspectives: information service orchestration, application
service deployment, and privacy protection.
The first contribution of this dissertation research is the development of ISYMPHONY,
a distributed IoT service orchestration architecture for scaling real-time and on-demand IoT
services provisioning in large scale IoT systems while guaranteeing the quality of service
with respect to performance, availability, and security. The main idea is to provide intelli-
gent partition of a real time IoT computing task into an optimal coordination between the
server side processing at IoT gateway and smart edge client side processing on edge de-
vices. This computation partitioning and data partitioning architecture enable edge devices
and edge clients running on top of edge devices to contribute to the IoT computing tasks
based on their computing and communication capacities.
The second contribution of this dissertation research is the design and development of
FOGGY, a framework for continuous automation of IoT application deployment in the three
layer (edge-gateway-Cloud) IoT environment. The core idea of FOGGY is to facilitate
xiv
dynamic resource provisioning and to automate application deployment in next generation
IoT infrastructure, enabling data processing to be performed at or close to where the data
is generated.
The third technical contribution of this dissertation research is the design and imple-
mentation of privacy-preserving models and algorithms for enabling privacy-aware IoT
systems and services. Concretely, we developed two systems: StarCloak and PrivacyZone.
StarCloak is a query utility-aware, privacy-preserving, and attack-resilient model and a
suite of algorithms for mobile objects in the spatially constrained environments, such as
moving on the road networks. A comprehensive performance study shows that StarCloak
outperforms existing anonymization techniques on both privacy protection and service per-
formance. PrivacyZone is the first spatial trigger based systems to establish personalized
privacy quarantine areas in the physical or cyber space to enable objects and people to





The Internet of Things (IoT) has been considered the next industrial revolution. Connect-
ing physical objects to the Internet and equipping massive sensor generated data with the
powerful data analytics capabilities, the IoT holds the potential to transform our everyday
life from work, travel, leisure, to entertainment. Smart cities, self-driving vehicles, health
monitoring systems are just a few applications of the IoT to name. Because of the numerous
opportunities that IoT provides, the number of connected devices is increasing rapidly. It
is expected that by 2025 the number of connected devices will reach 100 billion with more
than $11.1 trillion global economic impact [1, 2]. This increasing number of smart things
will generate huge amounts of data that need to be collected, processed and stored. Cisco
predicts that in 2020, the total amount of data created by any device will reach 600 ZB per
year [3]. At the same time, the large scale IoT deployment comprised of a huge number of
interconnected and heterogeneous wireless and mobile devices, enabling continuous mon-
itoring of activities, events and happenings in our environments and our society. We argue
that the large scale IoT deployment demands privacy-aware big data systems and services
that can deliver real-time and life enhancing experiences while respecting both data pri-
vacy and user privacy. This dissertation research contributes original ideas and innovative
techniques in the context of Internet of Things from three perspectives: information service
orchestration, application service deployment, and privacy protection.
1.1 Motivation
Intelligent and scalable orchestration of massive IoT objects using a multi-tier architecture
is critical to embrace the vision of IoT. In conventional client-server systems, clients are
primarily sending requests and receiving results and are considered too thin to participate
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in computation tasks. However, as the growth rate of the IoT devices continues to escalate,
and the capacity of wireless devices continues to sprout, in order to scale IoT services
provisioning in real time, we need to revolutionize the conventional client-server computing
architecture. Furthermore, we argue that the conventional server-only architectures may not
be able to meet the requirements of latency-sensitive IoT applications. For example, it is
not realistic to send all of the data generated by autonomous cars (40GB per hour) to the
centralized Cloud and expect real-time decision. We argue that an effective orchestration
framework for large scale IoT system should leverage the computational capacity of smart
things.
Deploying, managing, and updating IoT applications on a multi-tier architecture intro-
duce new challenges. First of all, computational partition should be dynamic and adaptive
such that it can leverage the capacity of edge devices by taking into account of multidi-
mensional factors, such as data locality, resource capacity and workload demand at all IoT
orchestration tiers: edge devices, midway servers, and Cloud data centers. The first re-
search challenge is to develop the system-level facilities for optimizing the performance of
edge gateway for scaling distributed orchestration to large number of IoT objects. We need
resource-aware allocation models that can dynamically schedule and allocate resources,
such as containers, among edge clients running on the same edge device, to enable on-
demand execution of edge-client specific tasks with high throughput and low latency. Sim-
ilarly, we need workload-aware resource scheduling of multiple services provisioning tasks
running concurrently on the same midway server(s), while taking into account of the ob-
ject side processing workloads at each edge gateway. The second research challenge is the
resource aware selection of computation and execution environments for a collection of
IoT service provisioning requests. This involves the decision on how and what to offload
from edge devices to a network of IoT midway stations (servers) and/or to an IoT appli-
cation specific cloud data center. Another problem related to the second challenge is the
placement of midway server nodes and the overlay network management of these servers.
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The ubiquitous wireless connectivity, the universal presence of smart mobile devices
with multi-modal sensing capability, and the increased investments from industry and gov-
ernment on the Internet of Things (IoT) have fueled the growth of the Location-based ser-
vices (LBS). Juniper Research [4] forecasts that the LBS market will reach $43.3 billion
in revenue by 2019, rising from an estimated $12.2 billion in 2014. [5] reports that %74
of adult smartphone owners use their phones to get direction or information based on their
current locations. As more and more mobile travelers and vehicles are connected contin-
uously and automatically, and as we are marching towards the grand vision of Internet of
Everything, we are embraced by many life-enriching location-based experiences and ser-
vices (e.g., improved emergency assistance, real-time traffic alerts). However, for many
location-based services and mobile data management applications, location queries are the
fundamental functionality and continuous location exposure opens doors to the intrusion
of location privacy [6]. For example, even if users identifiers are removed from their lo-
cation queries, successive position updates can be linked to identify individuals with high
confidence. Unauthorized trajectory exposure may also expose mobile users of LBSs to
significant vulnerabilities for abuse such as unwanted advertisement, stalking, and location
spoofing. In addition, when private location data of a mobile user is linked to sensitive
public locations such as mental health clinics, cancer treatment centers, nightclubs, and re-
ligious organizations, such unauthorized location - identity linkage may cause ethical, pro-
fessional, and social risks to both individuals and our society at large. The third research
challenge of this dissertation is to investigate and develop privacy preserving location ser-
vice architectures with innovative techniques and systems for protecting both user privacy
and location privacy while delivering location based IoT services.
Over the last decade, research on location privacy has gained increased attentions. The
most representative location privacy preserving technique, location k-anonymization, hide
the exact location of a mobile user by replacing it with a k-anonymized cloaking region in
user’s location query, which guarantees that at least k mobile users share the same cloaked
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region as their published location. A subject is considered location k - anonymous if its
location is indistinguishable from k−1 other users’ location [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. However, loca-
tion k-anonymization algorithms suffer from a number of known problems: (1) Most exist-
ing algorithms compute the anonymized location solely based on specific location-privacy
metric or metrics. Very few of these algorithms has incorporated location utility and lo-
cation query cost into consideration in their spatial cloaking decisions. (2) Most existing
location privacy algorithms are vulnerable to complex replay attacks such as correlation-
and query injection-based attacks. (3) Most existing solutions develop spatial obfuscation
techniques based on the random waypoint mobility model [11, 12], in which mobile trav-
elers move in arbitrary directions at random speed. These solutions fail to address privacy
risks when mobile users traveling in a spatially constrained environment such as a road
network in which both user mobility and location query processing are constrained by the
underlying road network. For example, as a spatial cloaking region may contain a single
road segment when we use rectangle-based spatial cloaking techniques, they are vulnerable
because adversaries can easily track the whereabouts of mobile users.
Furthermore, the existing privacy protection techniques based on spatial cloaking achieve
privacy at high cost of location utility loss and quality loss of location based services
(LBSs). This is because the exact location is typically positioning point. Thus, many exist-
ing location-based applications (e.g., Apple App store, Google play) are designed to accept
focal location as an exact GPS coordinate instead of a spatial region. One can reduce the
spatial resolution of cloaking by either minimizing the cloaking region or by not cloaking
every positioning location at the same protection granularity. We argue that the capability
for differentiation of sensitive locations from less or non-sensitive locations may signif-
icantly improve the utility of LBSs while preserving location and user privacy. Another
problem with conventional spatial cloaking based location privacy solutions is the inherent
limitation and lack of robustness for protecting privacy when providing continuous loca-
tion monitoring services, such as step-counter applications (e.g., Runkeeper). Well known
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vulnerabilities include consecutive region based inference attacks, replay attack, transition
attacks, to name a few.
1.2 Disseratation Scope and Contributions
This dissertation makes the following contributions to address the technical challenges de-
scribed above.
1.2.1 Information Service Orchestration
The first contribution of this dissertation research is the development of ISYMPHONY, a
distributed IoT service orchestration architecture for scaling real-time and on-demand IoT
services provisioning in large scale IoT systems while guaranteeing the quality of service
with respect to performance, availability, and security. The main idea is to provide intelli-
gent partition of a real time IoT computing task into an optimal coordination between the
server side processing at IoT gateway and smart edge client side processing on edge de-
vices. This computation partitioning and data partitioning architecture enable edge devices
and edge clients running on top of edge devices to contribute to the IoT computing tasks
based on their computing and communication capacities.
1.2.2 Application Service Deployment
The second contribution of this dissertation research is the design and development of
FOGGY, a framework for continuous automation of IoT application deployment in the
three layer (edge-gateway-Cloud) IoT environment. The core idea of FOGGY is to facil-
itate dynamic resource provisioning and to automate application deployment in next gen-
eration IoT infrastructure, enabling data processing to be performed at or close to where
the data is generated. We analyze several applications and identify their requirements that
need to be taken into consideration in our design of the FOGGY framework that manages
resources and deploys IoT applications with minimal developer efforts.
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1.2.3 Privacy Protection
The third technical contribution of this dissertation research is the design and implementa-
tion of privacy-preserving models and algorithms for enabling privacy-aware IoT systems
and services. Concretely, we developed two systems: StarCloak and PrivacyZone.
StarCloak is a query utility-aware and attack-resilient location privacy model and a
suite of road-network aware location cloaking algorithms. By utilizing the movement and
motion behavior of mobile clients on the spatially constrained road networks, we develop a
suite of location cloaking techniques that minimize the location utility losses and maximize
the attack resilience. Through a comprehensive performance evaluation, we show that
StarCloak outperforms existing anonymization techniques in terms of both location privacy
protection and location service performance.
PrivacyZone is the first location privacy protection system based on the concept of
privacy zones and the execution model of spatial triggers. We introduce the concept of
privacy zones for dual purposes: First, privacy zones can be used to enable mobile users
to differentiate their location queries or location service requests when they are residing
or moving to sensitive locations or spatial regions of interest. Second, privacy zones are
introduced to improve the overall utility and service quality of location queries and LBSs.
Unlike the conventional approaches that rely on spatial cloaking of every focal location of
location queries, the use of privacy zones allow mobile users to selectively establish their
personalized privacy quarantine areas in either physical space (such as on road networks)
or cyber space (such as on social networks). By enforcing privacy protection for users
entering their pre-defined privacy zones, we can provide high degree of privacy protection
while maintaining high degree of service quality and location utility, while maintaining
spatial and temporal privacy at both selected area of interests and selected time interval
of interest. In order to minimize the battery consumption for continuous monitoring of
whether mobile objects are entering their privacy zones, we design and implement a suite
of energy efficient PrivacyZone enforcement algorithms, which provide real-time spatial
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and temporal alerts for users who enter or approach their personalized privacy-zones and
which enforce privacy protection for those users residing in their privacy zones. In addition,
we designed a novel PrivacyZone based mobile permission system, which provides mobile
users more flexibility to enforce their privacy permissions, while minimizing their efforts
of defining privacy zones of interest. Our experimental results demonstrate the utility and
privacy protection of PrivacyZone in real road network environments.
1.3 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized into four technical chapters and conclude in Chap-
ter 6. Each chapter addresses one or more of the problems described above. In each chap-
ter, we introduce the background of the problem being addressed, describe related work,
and present our solution techniques followed by experimental evaluation. Concretely, in
Chapter 2, we present our vision and our initial development of a distributed orchestration
framework, ISYMPHONY, with the ultimate-goal of scaling real-time and on-demand IoT
services provisioning in large scale IoT systems, while guaranteeing quality of service with
respect to performance, availability and security. In Chapter 3, we introduce Foggy frame-
work that facilitates dynamic resource provisioning and automated application deployment
in Fog Computing architectures. In Chapter 4, we present STARCLOAK, a utility-aware
and attack-resilient cloaking-based location privacy-preserving approach for mobile travel-
ers on road networks. In Chapter 5, we introduce the novel concept of PrivacyZone and a
suit of algorithms for constructing personalized privacy-zones and enforcing privacy-zone
protection for mobile users on the roads. We summarize the main contributions of this
dissertation and discuss our future research directions in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
DISTRIBUTED ORCHESTRATION IN LARGE-SCALE IOT SYSTEMS
With the growing popularity of smart things and the omnipresence of wireless communi-
cations, the Internet continues to revolutionize from the Internet of hosts, to the Internet
of People, to the Internet of Things (IoT). Intelligent and scalable orchestration of mas-
sive IoT objects using a multi-tier architecture are critical to embrace the vision of IoT.
In this work, we present our vision and our initial development of a distributed orches-
tration framework, called ISYMPHONY, with the ultimate-goal of scaling real-time and
on-demand IoT services provisioning in large scale IoT systems, while guaranteeing qual-
ity of service with respect to performance, availability and security. This work makes two
original contributions. First, we present a distributed orchestration architecture that en-
ables edge devices and edge clients running on top of edge devices to contribute to the IoT
computing tasks based on their computing and communication capacities. A main idea
behind our distributed IoT orchestration architecture is the intelligent partition of a real
time IoT computing task into an optimal coordination of server-side processing and IoT
object side processing. Second, a set of optimization techniques are introduces to limit
the amount of computations handled by the edge clients and to enhance the overall per-
formance and resource utilization of the ISYMPHONY system. Our experimental results
show that ISYMPHONY can lead to significant saving in terms of server load and high ac-
curacy by leveraging and coordinating edge client processing capabilities, compared to the
solutions relying solely on server level processing for real time IoT services provisioning.
2.1 Introduction
With the growing popularity of smart things and the omnipresence of wireless commu-
nications, we witness the continued revolution of the Internet from the Internet of hosts
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interconnected via TCP-IP protocol, to the Internet of people interconnected via social
networks, to the Internet of smart things interconnected via multi-tier communication over-
lays. Internet of everything (IoE) will eventually become a reality when everything in
physical space can be powered on and connected to the Internet, enabling every object in
the physical space to interact with the cyberspace at any time and any place.
In large scale IoT application systems, such as smart cities, smart buildings, self-driving
cars, we observe two unique characteristics, compared to conventional computing systems:
(i) the number of smart objects in the form of edge devices or edge clients running on an
edge device is massive; and (ii) many of these edge devices are fat clients with computa-
tion and communication capacity equivalent to traditional laptop and desktop computers.
As the growth rate of fat edge clients continues to escalate, and the capacity of edge devices
continues to sprout, we need to revolutionize the conventional client-server computing ar-
chitecture in order to scale IoT services provisioning in real time. Concretely, in conven-
tional client-server systems, clients are primarily sending requests and receiving results and
are considered too thin to participate in both client-initiated or server initiated computation
tasks. An example of client-initiated IoT computing task is to request the neighborhood
traffic information by a moving vehicle. A typical server initiated task is to collect infor-
mation on traffic density at multiple geographical regions of a city to provide an overall
picture of the traffic situations in the major roads of a city.
In this work, we argue that an effective orchestration framework for large scale IoT
system should address both vertical orchestration and horizontal orchestration. The former
centers on orchestrating the vertical stack of the IoT computing and communication, rang-
ing from hardware, device firmware, computer networking and software defined networks,
server virtualization and cloud computing. The latter focuses on leveraging the computa-
tional capacity of smart things at the edge of the IoT computing infrastructure. We present
our vision and our initial design and development efforts towards the design and implemen-
tation of a distributed IoT orchestration architecture. A main idea behind this architecture
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Figure 2.1: IoT Computing Architecture
is the intelligent partition of a real time IoT computing task into an optimal coordination
of server-side processing and IoT object side processing. Such partition offers dual bene-
fits: (i) it allows scaling real time IoT service provisioning with a high degree of precision
when IoT objects are on the move; and (ii) it enables resource aware and workload adaptive
distribution of computation through careful coordination of multi-tier IoT orchestration ar-
chitecture. We envision that such computational partition should be dynamic and adaptive
such that it can leverage the capacity of edge devices and fat clients running on top of such
edge devices by taking into account of multi-dimensional factors, such as data locality, re-
source capacity and workload demand at all three IoT orchestration tiers: edge gateways
(edge devices), midway servers (e.g., fog nodes [13]), and cloud data centers. Figure 2.1
shows a sketch of the three tier IoT computing architecture.
In our approach, we treat smart IoT objects as a first-class computation player and treat
an edge device as a first-class IoT execution environment. For presentation convenience,
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in the rest of the chapter we use edge clients and IoT objects interchangeably and use edge
devices and edge gateways interchangeably when no confusion occurs. We envision three
main challenges in making edge clients as the first-class players in an IoT computational
model and making edge devices as the first class and an integral component in the execution
environment of an IoT services provisioning system.
The first challenge is the locality and workload aware computation partitioning between
midway servers and edge gateways and between edge gateway and edge clients running on
the corresponding edge device. Each edge device has an edge gateway to coordinate the
deployment and communication requests of its edge clients running on the respective edge
device. For example, an iPhone as an edge device may install an edge gateway module
of ISYMPHONY, which will coordinate those iPhone applications to transport their sensed
data in either raw or aggregated form to the midway servers and/or the respective cloud data
centers. Similarly, a self-driving car as a powerful edge device can have an ISYMPHONY
edge gateway to coordinate and manage all sensor readings collected from different types
of built-in sensors, such as brake, engine, front, back, side camera and so forth. On each
midway server, multiple IoT services provisioning tasks submitted by different edge gate-
ways may be running concurrently. Moreover, on each edge gateway, IoT service requests
from multiple edge clients may be running concurrently. For example, Googlemap, iMes-
sage, Step counter applications, and music applications may be running concurrently on
an iPhone when this iPhone user is on the move. An intelligent task partitioning mech-
anism can divide a service provisioning task into server-side processing and object-side
processing components to enable real-time services provisioning with high scalability.
The second challenge is to develop the system-level facilities for optimizing the perfor-
mance of edge gateway for scaling distributed orchestration to large number of IoT objects.
We need resource-aware allocation models that can dynamically schedule and allocate re-
sources, such as containers, among edge clients running on the same edge device, to enable
on-demand execution of edge-client specific tasks with high throughput and low latency.
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Similarly, we need workload-aware resource scheduling of multiple services provisioning
tasks running concurrently on the same midway server(s), while taking into account of the
object side processing workloads at each edge gateway.
The third challenge is the resource aware selection of computation and execution envi-
ronments for a collection of IoT service provisioning requests. This involves the decision
on how and what to offload from edge devices to a network of IoT midway stations (servers)
and/or to an IoT application specific cloud data center. Another problem related to the third
challenge is the placement of midway server nodes and the overlay network management
of these servers.
In this work, we focus on the first challenge. We present our vision and our ini-
tial development of a distributed orchestration framework, called ISYMPHONY, with the
ultimate-goal of scaling real-time and on-demand IoT services provisioning in large scale
IoT systems. The design of ISYMPHONY is novel from a number of perspectives. First,
ISYMPHONY promotes a distributed orchestration architecture. A main idea behind our
distributed architecture is the intelligent partition of a real time IoT computing task into an
optimal coordination of server-side processing and object-side processing, especially for
those moving IoT objects. Second, we develop a road network-based partitioning mecha-
nism that considers the density of each segment in order to minimize the number of inter-
partition changes. Third, a set of optimization techniques are employed to limit the amount
of computations handled by the edge clients and to enhance the overall performance and
resource utilization of the ISYMPHONY system. Last but not the least, in ISYMPHONY, a
network of IoT midway servers is maintained dynamically and collaborating in a decen-
tralized manner. This network of ISYMPHONY gateway servers collectively manage the
IoT objects that are distributed over a geographical universe of discourse through the edge
gateway modules running on edge devices. Each of our ISYMPHONY midway servers is
responsible for a geographical region of interest, and in charge of managing and interacting
with the edge devices and edge clients residing in the corresponding geographical region.
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2.2 System Model
2.2.1 IoT Computing Reference Model
In the large scale IoT systems managed by ISYMPHONY, we envision three tier IoT com-
puting architecture with cloud data center at the top tier, midway servers at the middle tier
and edge gateways at the bottom tier, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. An edge gateway con-
sists of the edge computing modules of ISYMPHONY, which manages the data collection
from sensors on edge devices, in-edge aggregation and transport data in raw or aggregated
form to the IoT gateway server(s) at the middle tier. IoT cloud as the top tier. Each edge
gateway manages sensors enabled on one edge device, such as a self-driving car and its
sensors, or an iPhone and its motion sensor or GPS or Wifi positioning sensor. A midway
server will interact with the set of edge gateways residing in the geographical region it is
responsible for. A failover facility will be enabled upon the pre-defined connection time-
out to take over the responsibility of the failed server. The cloud datacenter can request
in-transit data aggregation from midway servers or raw data collections from a selection of
edge gateways.
We assume that an IoT service request can come from any of the three tiers. However,
the requests from cloud tier and gateway tier are typically related to data summarization or
data aggregation tasks, whereas the requests from edge clients running on edge devices are
typically location-based content queries, such as ”Tell me the traffic situation, such as den-
sity of vehicles on the road or the average travel time in the last 10 minutes, on the nearby
road segments or road intersections within 5-mile radius”. We refer to such edge client
service request as edge query and we refer to those moving vehicles as IoT objects (or edge
clients when edge devices are involved). An edge query is typically targeted on IoT objects
which can be in motion or static objects nearby a moving car or a pedestrian in motion,
such as gas stations, restaurants, hospitals. In this work, we will focus on how to scale
the IoT services requests in the presence of a large number of IoT objects in motion. To
13
Figure 2.2: Distributed Orchestration in ISYMPHONY (Self-Driving Cars)
simplify the discussion of the system design requirements, execution model and optimiza-
tion techniques, we focus on self-driving cars as an example IoT application and restrict
the type of IoT services requests to be range-based location queries, such as nearby traffic
flows or nearby accidents of a moving car. Figure 2.2 uses the scenario of self-driving cars
to illustrate the distributed orchestration in ISYMPHONY.
2.2.2 System Assumptions
The design of the ISYMPHONY system is based on several assumptions. Most of these
assumptions are widely agreed upon by many or have been seen as common practice in
monitoring and tracking of moving objects [14].
First, IoT objects are smart objects. They are able to locate their position and determine
their velocity vector, e.g., using GPS or WiFi localization when on the move. This is a
reasonable assumption as GPS is becoming inexpensive and are used widely in cars and
other hand-held devices. Examples are users with iPhone or self-driving cars. For instance,
a pedestrian with an iPhone may have multiple applications running to guide her walk
path and entertain her during her exercise. We consider each application as an edge client
running on the iPhone (edge device) of this user and each edge client may issue an IoT
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service request. For example, googlemap on the iPhone may ask for a walk path, music
application may search for a song of interest, or recommend a song to this user, and the step
count application may plot the summary of steps or display the step counts of other friends
on the same day or in the past week. Thus, we treat the user with iPhone as the IoT object
and all edge client-based requests issued from the same user as the IoT service requests
(queries) with the location of this user as the focal point of the query services. Similarly, in
self-driving car scenarios, a smart car is an IoT object and also the edge device on which
several sensors are installed and different edge clients (applications) are running on the
edge device to collect and report data from different sensors, including camera in front,
back and sides of the cars, motion sensor, temperature sensor, brake sensor, and so forth.
These query service requests will be coordinated by the edge gateway running on the car
object.
Second, we assume that an IoT object has synchronized clocks, e.g., using GPS or
NTP [15]. Broadcast is used to establish connections from one IoT object to its nearby
objects and from midway server to its edge gateways. For example, an IoT object in mo-
tion can communicate with its neighbor objects by broadcasting using RF channels, such
as Bluetooth, and WiFi. The neighbor objects can be other moving cars or other mobile
users or static active objects such as roadside sensors or smart buildings. We assume that
IoT objects are smart things and they can learn about the surrounding environment such as
restaurants, gas stations, other types of buildings and houses through geographical database
of places or geographical database of static physical objects. These databases are optimized
by the spatial index structures. We consider an object (such as a building) a smart object if
it has some built-in capability to “see (detect) nearby moving objects and nearby surround-
ings.
Third, each IoT object has the computational capability to carry out the assigned com-
putational tasks, assuming the assignment is capability-aware. However, the problem of
resource allocation and resource scheduling in the presence of concurrent edge clients on
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the same edge device and concurrent execution of multiple IoT service requests on the same
midway server is considered beyond the scope of this work and is on the agenda for our
future work.
In addition, we assume that the geographical area of interest is covered by a network
of ISYMPHONY gateway servers. We assume that all IoT query requests issued from the
IoT objects are served through the distributed coordination between the midway server and
the set of edge gateway nodes. The IoT application specific data mining tasks are issued
from either the cloud datacenter or some midway servers. We classify all IoT services
provisioning requests into two categories: (i) IoT objects requesting services from other
moving objects and (ii) IoT objects requesting information from static objects. Here IoT
objects can be moving or static. Given that the second type of IoT services requests can be
processed easily by utilizing spatial indexing over the database of static objects [14]. Thus,
in this work we focus on describing how ISYMPHONY handles the first type of IoT services
requests.
2.3 Distributed Orchestration Architecture
We observe that in a typical IoT system, the IoT objects, such as self-driving cars, are
typically interested in other nearby moving objects, regardless of the number of objects
in the whole universe. Motivated by this observation, in our distributed orchestration ar-
chitecture each IoT object determines by itself whether or not it should be included in the
result of a location query issued by a nearby moving object. This approach minimizes the
server load and communication network usage between edge gateway nodes and midway
servers as moving objects that are not nearby of any location queries do not need to report
their positions. In order to provide efficient distributed orchestration, we need to develop
algorithms to carefully partition the processing cost between the IoT moving objects and
midway servers.
Our orchestration platform is build on the partitioning of the geographical universe of
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interest. Partitions are used to determine IoT objects that should participate to computation
of a certain service request. Specifically, when an IoT object, such as self-driving car or
mobile user, issue a range query, it sends following information to the midway server:
location, velocity vector (direction and speed), object of interest, and range (r) value. Then
midway server identify partitions that are within r distance to the query focal object’s
current partition. The distance between two partitions is the smallest distance of any point
in those partitions, assuming that an IoT object can move to any point in its current partition.
Midway server install query on objects that are residing on those nearby partitions. After
this point, IoT objects are responsible to identify if they are within the query range or not.
IoT objects check all registered queries periodically by comparing their current location and
query focal object’s predicted location based on its last known location, time, and velocity
vector. IoT objects notify midway servers in following situations: (i) object exits from its
current partition, (ii) object enters/exits to/from any query range that they are responsible
to monitor, (iii) there is a significant change in the object’s velocity vector (query focal
objects only). This architecture design is especially effective when the number of moving
IoT objects in the geographical region of interest is large and the number of IoT queries is
relatively small.
The efficiency of our distributed orchestration architecture is highly depended on the
structure of pre-generated partitions since it affects the number of objects responsible to
answer a certain query and the number of location update from objects to the server due
to partition change. In order to minimize the number of inter-partition passes, unlike the
related work [14] that use grid-based partitioning, we introduce road network partitioning
mechanism. Because, most of the IoT mobile objects’ movements are restricted with the
underlying road network or walking paths (e.g., autonomous cars) and grid cells may in-
tersect only a small portion of the road segment, which causes frequent partition change
during object’s trip. Since mobile objects need to monitor their stay in the current partition,
objects should be able to check containment with low energy consumption. To this end, we
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used the middle of road segment as a border point of the partition instead of junctions. Be-
cause, with edge-based partitioning, an object can identify the time of exit by considering
single border point, however, junction-based partitioning require expensive polygon con-
tainment check for the object as some of the neighbor segments of the junction can be part
of the current partition. In addition, we consider the density of segments and our algorithm
priorities dense segments to be in the same partitions. Ordered segment queue based on
their densities is generated before the partitioning algorithm starts. We also use a system
defined distance threshold that limits the maximum diameter (i.e., the distance of any two
points in the partition) to control the size of the partition. The algorithm for constructing
road network partitions start by assigning each junction and half of its neighbor segments
as initial partitions. Then one selects a segment from a queue and combine its neighbor
partitions if the new partition satisfies predefined distance threshold. The algorithm contin-
ues until all segments in the queue evaluated. Figure 2.5 shows an example partition with
grey segments. After generating all partitions one calculates the pairwise distance from
each partition to all other partitions and stored in the midway servers in order to minimize
search time to identify partitions within a range when an IoT object issued a query.
2.4 Optimizations
To provide efficient implementation of our distributed orchestration architecture for pro-
cessing IoT service requests at both server side and IoT object side, we described two
optimizations used in ISYMPHONY.
Dead Reckoning. In the real world environment, the velocity vector of the IoT mobile
object changes constantly because of several reasons such as road condition, GPS error,
or human factors. This cause excessive number of location update from query focal ob-
ject to the midway server as it notifies other objects for each velocity change to maintain
the correctness of the query result even though the change is not significant. In order to
control the number of location update, we use a dead reckoning technique to measure the
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Figure 2.3: Dead Reckoning
significance of the velocity change. Concretely, at each time step, the focal object compare
its current location to the location that it would reach if it continued to maintain its previ-
ously published velocity vector as other objects rely on that information to predict objects
current location. If the distance is larger than the predefined threshold, ∆, it updates its ve-
locity vector to the midway servers which broadcast the change to the objects responsible
for responding the focal object’s query. Figure 2.3 illustrates dead reckoning optimization
mechanism. After the object sends its current velocity vector, v1, and location to the server,
at each time step based on its speed and direction it identifies locations (blue circles) on
the predicted path. The distance between object’s exact locations (blue rectangles) at time
t2, t3, and t4 is smaller than the threshold ∆ and it is not necessary to update its velocity
change to the server. However, when the distance between current location and the pre-
dicted location is larger than the threshold as the time step t5, it updates its current location
to the server and changes it predicted path based on new velocity vector.
Safe Period. An IoT object evaluates periodically set of queries that are registered by
the midway server and its location to identify if it exits from its current partition. However,
frequent evaluations introduce unnecessary computation load to the IoT objects especially
when the inclusion of object to the certain query or partition will not change in the near
future. A safe-period optimization applied to minimize the number of evaluation that IoT
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Figure 2.4: Safe period optimization for query evaluation
object needs to perform by introducing a hibernation time which guarantees even the object
moves with maximum possible speed within the time interval, objects inclusion to a certain
query or its current partition would not change.
We use safe-period optimization in two situations: query evaluation and partition evalu-
ation. In the former case, an IoT mobile object identify hibernation time for each registered
query by assuming the worst case scenario where both object move to each with maximum
speed speed. In such scenario, the time required to pass for object to locate inside the area
of query range is calculated as sp(om, of ) =
dist(om,of )−r
max vel(om)+max vel(of )
, in which dist(om, of )
denote the Euclidean distance from an object om to query focal object of and r is the dis-
tance of range query as illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Similarly, we use safe period optimization for partition evaluation where mobile object
checks if its current partition changes. In this case, an IoT object identifies the closest bor-
der node from its current location and calculates hibernation time based on the distance and
its maximum possible speed, since the border nodes are static in this case. Figure 2.5 shows















Figure 2.5: Safe period optimization for partition evaluation
rent partition depicted with gray lines. When the IoT objects wakes-up it finds the closest
border node, b5 of the partition and calculates safe period based on their Euclidean distance
as sp(o, bc) =
dist(o,bc)
max vel(o)
. As demonstrated in MobiEye [14], SpatialAlarm [16], and Road-
Alarm [17], this optimization can be very effective to minimize computation requirement
on the resource constraint devices.
2.5 Experiments
In this section, we conduct simulation-based experiments to evaluate our solution. We use
GTMobiSim [18] with realistic traffic patterns to generate 20,000 of IoT objects moving
on the road network of an urban area of Atlanta,GA which covers 11 km ( 6.8 miles) by
14 km (8.7 miles) area. The road network consist of four different road types: residential
roads and freeway interchange with 30 mph speed limit (48 km/h), highway with 55 mph
limit (89 km/h) and freeway with 70 mph limit (113 km/h). has 431 and 681 road segments
having 70 mph and 55 mph speed limit respectively. The other road segments have 30 mph
speed limit. The number of IoT services requests range from 20 to 200. We randomly
select focal objects of the queries using a uniform distribution. The spatial region of a
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query is taken as a circular region whose radius is a random variable following a normal
distribution.
We compare our distributed query processing approach with popular central query pro-
cessing approach that uses R*-Tree [19] to index queries. When a new object position is
received, it runs through the query index to determine to which queries this object actu-
ally contributes. Then, the object is added to the results of these queries and is removed
from the results of other queries that have included it as a target object before. We also
compare our approach with grid-partitioning-based mobile monitoring system introduced
at [14]. All experiments are performed on a Windows 7 platform with Intel(R) Core(TM)
CPU (4.00 GHz) and 16GB memory
2.5.1 Server Side Computation Cost
First, we measure the server load as the time required to execute server-side processing for
the period of the simulation run with respect to the number of queries. Both grid and our
road network partitioning-based distributed orchestration architecture provides significant
improvement on server load. The main reason is that the query index approach needs to
update the spatial index for every location change of the query focal objects. Also, our road
network-based partitioning mechanism outperforms the simple grid-based partitioning sys-
tem. This is mainly because of the minimal inter-partition change of the mobile objects
achieved by the road network partitioning. As expected all approaches’ performance wors-
ens as the number of queries increase.
2.5.2 Object Side Computation Cost
In this section, we study the amount of computation placed on the mobile object side by
our distributed orchestration approach to the processing of IoT services requests. Figure
2.6b shows an average execution time at the object side for grid and road network-based
partitioning with different partition size threshold (alpha). For the grid-based partitioning,
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Figure 2.6: Experimental results of ISYMPHONY
the alpha is set as the diagonal distance of square grid cell. Note that we applied our
optimization techniques for both approaches. Results show that our road network-based
partitioning mechanism provides lower IoT object overhead because of two reasons. First,
when a query issued from any object, the number of object install this query is higher in
grid-based partition, since if the query range intersect with any point on the grid cell it
install query for all object in that cell even though mobile object cannot reach intersect
area because of the underlying road network constraint. Another reason is, for partition
evaluation in grid-based approach object needs to consider any location on the square as
a possible border point of the partition. However, in our system objects are aware of the
border points of the partition and generated hibernation times higher than the grid-based
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approach as shown in the Figure 2.6c.
2.5.3 Communication Cost
Finally, we measure the communication cost as the number of the message send to the
midway server from IoT objects. We only measured the number of location update because
of the partition change, since it is the only differentiation factor of the partitioning mecha-
nisms with respect to communication cost. Figure 2.6d proves that considering underlying
road network improves communication cost performance by minimizing the amount of
inter-partition changes of mobile users.
2.6 Related Work
Scaling large scale IoT systems and applications is a challenging problem. Several re-
search efforts have been centered on innovative designs of underlying IoT infrastructure.
LEONORE [20] proposes a service oriented infrastructure for providing elastic provision-
ing of IoT application components on resource constrained and heterogeneous edge devices
for large scale IoT deployment. Geelytics [21] presents a system for on-demand edge an-
alytics over IoT interfaced sensors and actuators with bandwidth optimization. [22] is the
first to propose the sensing and actuating as a service (SAaaS) paradigm for geographically
distributed IoT infrastrucrure. [23] presents an abstraction for IoT service provisioning in
the Cloud. [24] proposes an approach for auto-configuration of IoT infrastructure based on
heuristic based configuration suggestions. [25] presents a smart city based IoT framework
and [26] develops an IoT experimentation based on a smart city testbed. We build the first




FOGGY: A FRAMEWORK FOR CONTINUOUS AUTOMATED IOT
APPLICATION DEPLOYMENT IN FOG COMPUTING
Traditional Cloud model is not designed to handle latency-sensitive Internet of Things ap-
plications. The new trend consists on moving data to be processed close to where it was
generated. To this end, Fog Computing paradigm suggests using the compute and storage
power of network elements. In such environments, intelligent and scalable orchestration
of thousands of heterogeneous devices in complex environments is critical for IoT Service
providers. In this chapter, we present a framework, called Foggy, that facilitates dynamic
resource provisioning and automated application deployment in Fog Computing architec-
tures. We analyze several applications and identify their requirements that need to be taken
into consideration in our design of the Foggy framework. We implemented a proof of
concept of a simple IoT application continuous deployment using Raspberry Pi boards.
3.1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) connects physical objects to the virtual world and enables them
to sense and manipulate their environment by using sensors and actuators [27]. Connecting
physical world to the Internet creates life-enhancing opportunities in various domains like
smart homes/cities, self-driving vehicles, and health monitoring. Because of the numerous
opportunities that IoT provides, the number of connected devices is increasing rapidly, and
International Data Corporation (IDC) predicted that number to reach 29 billion by 2020
[28]. This increasing number of things is leading to generate huge amounts of data that need
to be collected, processed and stored. Cisco predicts that the total amount of data created
by any device will quadrapole in five years and in 2020 will reach 600 ZB per year [3].
Providing highly scalable solutions makes Cloud first-class citizen in the IoT environment
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along with the end-devices, or things, with limited compute and storage capacity. However,
traditional Cloud model is not designed to handle latency-sensitive IoT applications.
The new computing paradigm referred to as Fog Computing [13], extends cloud com-
puting services (compute, storage, and network) to the edges of the network. Instead of
sending all the data to the Cloud, Fog Computing uses network elements (e.g., gateways)
close to the device in order to provide low-latency and scalability. This plays a big role in
reducing the unnecessary bandwidth usage. For example, we can look at autonomous cars,
where real-time decisions are critical, they generate 40GB data per hour. It is not realistic
to try sending all the generated data to the cloud and expect to get decisions within mil-
liseconds. It is noteworthy that, the Fog paradigm does not substitute the Cloud but extends
it instead. The Cloud still remain as main component in IoT for applications that require
high computations and long-term storage.
Although, Fog Computing is an extension of Cloud, deploying, managing, and updating
IoT applications on such layered environment introduce new challenges. First of all, large
scale IoT applications include a huge number of heterogeneous resources with distinct
processing, memory, and storage capabilities. Second, workloads are dynamic on each of
the nodes in the network. Finally, each IoT application has its own requirements such as
latency-sensitivity, computation needs and privacy constraints. Therefore, the problem that
we are trying to solve is: how can we offer the needed mechanisms to enable a continuous
resources integration, planning, deployment and management in such a heterogeneous and
dynamic environment.
In this work, we present a framework, called Foggy, that facilitates dynamic resources
provisioning and automated application deployment in Fog Computing architectures. Our
specific contributions are:
• Analyzing a set of IoT applications and defining their requirements.
• Providing a framework that manages resources and deploys IoT applications with
minimal developer efforts.
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• Proposing task scheduling mechanisms to optimize the resources usage and minimize
the latency by considering application requirements and resource capabilities, costs,
and mobility.
• Using container-based virtualization to provide system isolation and small overhead
on resource constraint devices.
• Provide multi-node container update strategies based on the application requirements
and the resource availability.
• Identify bottlenecks in the system and provide suggestions for possible resource
placements.
3.2 Motivation and Background
Our goal is to propose a framework that minimizes developer effort to deploy, update,
and maintain large-scale geo-distributed IoT application codes while providing an efficient
management of each resource in an IoT environment. In this section, we will present a
common IoT infrastructure that supports large-scale IoT applications. Afterwards, we will
identify the applications’ requirements that need to be taken into consideration.
3.2.1 IoT Infrastructure
In this work, we consider commonly accepted three tier IoT infrastructures to support
large-scale IoT applications ( see Figure 3.1). Such infrastructures incorporate various
geo-distributed heterogeneous devices including sensors, actuators, compute resources, and
networking devices. These devices are logically divided into three categories based on their
roles:
• The first tier is composed of Edge devices such as smart phones, CCTV cameras,




















Figure 3.1: IoT Infrastructure
sensors and actuators. Edge devices can be static (e.g., pipe sensors) or mobile (e.g.,
connected cars) and their geo-spatial location information is provided during the in-
stallation process or by their integrated localization capabilities (e.g., GPS).
• The second tier is composed of Network infrastructure responsible of connecting the
devices, gateways and Cloud. This tier contains the needed mechanisms to transport
the data between the different devices and between the different layers (e.g., Edge,
Cloud, ...).
• The third tier is based on Cloud services that provide main compute and storage
resources to process, analyze and store the huge amount of data generated by edge
devices.
IoT applications often require instant decisions. For these kinds of decisions, using
the standard cloud model is not efficient for latency-sensitive geo-distributed IoT appli-
cations. Fog Computing has been proposed to decentralize data processing by extending
cloud compute power towards the IoT network. To this end, in addition to dedicated re-
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sources, current network elements (e.g., gateways) are not only a transferring medium, but
also used as compute resources to process data as closer as it can be to where it was gen-
erated. This approach not only minimizes the latency, but also decreases the bandwidth
usage.
3.2.2 Requirements
In this section we will identify several requirements that need to be taken into consideration
to effectively deploy IoT application on a defined infrastructure.
Latency Sensitivity
Many IoT applications depend on instant life-critical decisions and even second level laten-
cies are not tolerable. For example, in smart transportation systems roads and intersections
are equipped with various sensors to monitor cars moving on the adjacent road segments
and to detect whether there is an accident or not. Connected cars communicate with IoT
data sources (e.g., traffic lights, road sensors, other cars) to make a decision for the next
step. The query expected to be answered immediately by the closest edge node based on
real time data. In this scenario, any latency may lead to accidents.
Bandwidth Usage
Current large scale IoT sensors generate huge amounts of data each second. It is clear that
sending all the generated data to the cloud for analytics and processing is not an option.
For operational efficiency it is necessary to minimize data sent over the IoT network. For
instance, in a city surveillance system millions of cameras could be installed all around
the city. Security officers may ask the platform to track specific objects and receive fast
notifications whenever some suspicious objects have been detected. It is impossible to




IoT infrastructures are composed of heterogeneous devices with various compute power,
memory size, and storage capacities. An efficient resources management model is nec-
essary to optimize the usage of such physical devices in order to provide scalable IoT
applications. The model needs to make an optimal trade-off between processing the data
locally or sending it to the Cloud based on the amount of data and the available resources
and capabilities. It also needs to take into account the cost of the data transfer between the
different nodes (devices, edge, cloud, ...).
Mobility Support
In many IoT applications end devices are mobile such as smart phones and connected cars.
As the main goal of the Fog Computing is to move compute power close to where the data
is generated, it is necessary to be able to aggregate data at the closest network element
while the end devices are moving.
Dynamic Workloads
Unlike the centralized cloud model, in the Fog model, the mobility of the end devices and
objects of interest in the environment introduces new challenges related to the dynamic
compute, storage, and network requirements of the IoT applications. For example, camera
surveillance systems in shopping malls that track shoppers introduce dynamic workloads on
different fog nodes depending on the time and the location based on the shoppers’ density.
Multi-tenancy
Large IoT infrastructures are built to host multiple IoT applications with different require-
ments for different tenants. IoT service providers should ensure efficiency and fairness of
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Figure 3.2: Foggy Framework
Privacy
The types, amount, and specificity of data gathered by billions of devices create concerns
among individuals about their privacy and among organizations about the confidentiality
and integrity of their data. For example, smart homes enable patient self-treatment and
monitoring by using simple devices, which provide standardized outputs for specific phys-
iological conditions. The data can be used by intelligent applications capable of analyzing
and processing body signals, sensor-integrated smart devices and wearable sensors. Such
systems collect lots of sensitive information about residents. It is important to organize
application deployment based on privacy-preserving aggregation at the predefined network
level that prevents sending sensitive information to the unwanted resources.
3.3 Automated IoT Application Update and Deployment System
In this section we present the design of the framework to support large-scale geo-distributed
IoT applications and the overall application deployment process. The framework is illus-
trated in Figure 3.2.
3.3.1 IoT Applications
Large-scale IoT applications are based on processing data streams within several consec-
utive tasks. For example airport video surveillance system designed to identify passenger
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faces and notify security officers whenever there is a match with any person wanted by the
police. Such application requires several steps to run (see Figure 3.3) [29]. Basically, when
the frame is captured, some preprocessing techniques (e.g., background subtraction) are
applied to the image. Then, face detection techniques identify if the human faces appear in
the current frame. Output of this step is a set of patches containing each face in the input
image. In the feature extraction step, the faces are transformed into a vector. Finally, face
recognition step compares features in the database with the new detected faces (based on
the generated vector). If there is a match, a notification is sent to the security officers.
Figure 3.3: Video Surveillance System
In addition, IoT infrastructures are designed to support multiple applications. For in-
stance, in airport video surveillance system another possible application is to detect aban-
doned luggages to prevent terrorist attacks. Unlike previous application, after the object
detection step, it performs some object tracking algorithms. In the final step, it uses pat-
tern recognition techniques to identify if anybody left his baggage and notify the security
officers in real time [30].
Each task of IoT application has different compute and storage requirements. For ex-
ample, passenger movement data can provide useful information such as location-based
advertisement pricing. Such data analytics requires large amounts of trajectory data and
computation power.
In order to maximize resource efficiency and support multi-tenancy, task-sharing, and
easy software updates, we advocate to use container-based virtualization approach. Gen-
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erating containers for each task and running it on the different nodes maximize quality of
service and ensures the isolation. For example, running background subtraction and mo-
tion detection tasks on edge node eliminates any unnecessary video streaming to the high
level nodes. In addition, IoT applications target a wide variety of device platforms. Dur-
ing prototyping and early phases of development, IoT projects are often developed using
generic micro-controller-based development boards or single-board computers (SBCs) like
the Raspberry Pi. The embedded applications that are developed for these devices can
later be upgraded to run on custom prototype development boards and then finally on pro-
duction devices. Each device or device revision might also require different versions and
configurations of the development toolkits that are used for flashing, monitoring, and com-
municating with the device. Containers can be used to capture a development environment
that is known to work for each device revision, and to share this environment among a team
of developers 1.
In order to identify user preferences and each container behavior we define specifica-
tions using JSON format. Afterwards, the orchestration unit uses these specifications to
effectively and fairly place each container in the IoT infrastructure. Below we present an








Listing 3.1: Container Specification Example
1https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/mobile/library/iot-docker-containers/index.html
33
The Priority field defines the importance of the application. It is used to prioritize one
application when it is not possible to deploy multiple containers on the same resource con-
strained device. The Privacy field is the limit of the level that the container can run in the
IoT infrastructure hierarchy. The level is determined by the network distance from the edge
device to the cloud. For example, for privacy reasons raw images captured by the security
cameras may not be allowed to be sent beyond two levels of the hierarchy (edge devices
and edge gateway). The Computation field is used to describe how much compute power
is required for a given container. The Latency field defines the time-sensitivity of the task
and finally, the Output field defines the size of the result, which is an estimate bandwidth
usage. Note that the developer estimates such requirements for the initial deployment plan
but they can change over time due to the dynamic nature of IoT applications (e.g., Com-
putation). The Orchestration Server should monitor the resource usage and dynamically
adapt container placement and notify the user about if there are any possible bottlenecks.
We can put in place a machine learning algorithm that learns from the behavior of each
application/container and estimate its optimal configuration under different circumstances.
3.3.2 System Components
In the following, we describe the different components that form our proposed architecture.
Version Control Server
This server might be any system that allows the continuous collaboration of developers in
the development cycle of the IoT application. For instance, we can use any private or public
Git server to host the base code of the IoT application.
Continuous Integration Tool
This is important for using automated build systems for CI (Continuous Integration). It
allows early detection of possible build problems. CI makes sense when several contribu-
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tors/team are working on the same code repository, and there is a need to make sure that the
project is in a consistent state that allows any user to build it with all the team/contributors
code inputs/changes. At the end, built deliverables can be pushed to their destination. The
CI tool continuously monitor the code repository in the version control server, and when-
ever a change is detected, it kicks off the build and different tests of the new code (unit tests,
integration tests, acceptance tests...). For our IOT projects we can have different automatic
builds to be triggered after code commits on the code repository (for example, GitHub).
When the build is triggered, it is able to pull all dependencies and frameworks to build the
project on the automated build system.
Container Registry
Container Registry (CR) is a stateless and scalable Docker image storage (e.g., Docker
Registry 2). It is a private cloud storage to keep IoT application secure and constantly
accessible. Each IoT resource pull images from CR directly with secure HTTPS protocol.
All versions of the same image stored in CR for two reasons: (i) If the new version is not
working properly for any reason, it is important to roll-back immediately, (ii) Different
versions might be suitable for different devices in the IoT infrastructure.
Node
A node is an IoT device with compute and storage capabilities (e.g., gateways). We put in
place an Orchestration client code (agent) that runs on each node on top of the operating
system. It is responsible of pulling the container image from the registry, running/stop-
ping the application, as well as sending the information about the device and the hosted




Orchestration server is responsible of the scalable IoT application deployment and resource
management. In our design, the orchestration server is a part of cloud-based IoT service
provider (e.g., IBM Watson IoT 3). Two catalogs are maintained within the Orchestration
Server; resource catalog and application catalog. Resource catalog stores information about
the devices in the IoT infrastructure such as their capabilities, connections, and workloads.
Application related information such as the versions and the requirements is stored in the
Application catalog. In our architecture, the Resource monitor unit regularly checks each
node to identify capacity usage and if there is any bottleneck in the running application.
Whenever a new deployment request is received by the Request Handler Unit, the Deploy-
ment Planner tries to find the best strategy to run containers on the devices for optimal
quality of service. Once the deployment strategy is determined, it is passed to the Provi-
sioning Unit that applies defined container placement strategies by sending requests to the
corresponding nodes.
The service provider communicates with the IoT resource nodes through the orchestra-
tion client running on each node. In our design, such communication uses MQTT protocol
which is a simple, lightweight, publish/subscribe messaging protocol on top of the TCP/IP
protocol. It is one of the most used protocols for the IoT world. We identified several
interfaces used in this communication that client application running on IoT devices must
implement;
• get resource info (resource r) : Returns the current available resources (e.g., CPU,
storage) on the device.
• container info() : Returns the running instances information on the device.
• install(url u, proxy p, context c) : Pulls container from the registry and installs the
container. The context provides any eventual needed parameters to run the container.
3https://www.ibm.com/internet-of-things/platform/watson-iot-platform/
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• change proxy(container c, proxy p) : Change output proxy of the container.
• remove(container c) : Removes container from the device.
3.3.3 IoT Application Deployment and Update Workflow
The goal of the IoT Application Deployment platform is to minimize developers effort
to deploy and update applications in highly complex IoT infrastructures. We listed the
overall deployment workflow below. Here, we assume that the resources and applications
information are already maintained by the Orchestration Server.
(i) The user pushes the containerized application package and its requirements file to the
version control server.
(ii) The version control server creates a new version of the code with a unique SHA code.
(iii) The continuous integration tool uses the latest code (tagged with the latest SHA)
generates the application container, uploads it to the container registry, and notifies
the orchestration server.
(iv) The Deployment Planner identifies the containers placement strategy.
(v) The Provisioning Unit sends installation requests to each node with the container
registry url and configuration parameters.
(vi) The IoT nodes pull the container images and run the application components.
3.3.4 Planning and Provisioning Procedure
Determining an optimal container provisioning plan is a challenging process for thousands
of heterogeneous devices placed in complex infrastructure. It is important to have fast pro-
visioning mechanisms in order to meet instant update requirements (e.g., security updates).
To this end, we propose policy-based resource management procedure. We followed a
bottom-up approach to minimize latencies and bandwidth consumption.
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In our approach, starting from the first container of the application, the Deployment
Planner checks the data gathered by the Resource Monitor and saved in the Resource/
Application catalogs to check if the first node that will get the input data is able to host the
container based on its computation and storage requirements defined by the specification
file introduced in Section 3.3.1. If this node is available and able to host the container,
then, the container is assigned to the node and the provisioning step continues with the next
container in the sequence.
If the node is not available or not powerful enough next possible node in the hierarchy
is taken into consideration. The network nodes may connect with other nodes with similar
configurations on the same level (e.g., gateway to gateway) as well as the powerful nodes
in the higher level. Next node selection from the hierarchy can be one of the two types,
horizontal (on the same layer) or vertical (on the upper or lower layer), depends on certain
criteria. Horizontal selection consists on selecting a node from the same level, and it is
used when the vertical selection introduces more latency for time-sensitive application. If
the current level is the highest possible level that the container can run in, based on its
privacy requirements, horizontal selection is used to find the possible node in the same
level to run the container.
If the node does not meet container’s requirements more suitable nodes can be found
with vertical selection (going to the upper layer in this case). The process continues until
every container of the application is placed. If there are multiple applications, a priority
queue is created based on the application ”priority” values defined in the specification file.
The next node is selected after all applications’ containers are tested to be added in the
current node.
We are aware that the planning process might be specific for each use case scenario.
In order to remain open to all possibilities, we designed the Deployment Planner to be
pluggable in away that allows any user to bring his own deployment planning strategy and
add it to the system. If the existing strategies do not respond to the user’s needs he can
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follow the interface of the Deployment Planner and just plug it to our system. We also pro-
vide some predefined strategies that we think are essential in code distribution among the
nodes: 1) Deploy on a specific node: in this case, the planner will try to find the first node
that responds to the description of the user, if this node is found and contains the needed
resources, the provisioning starts in this node. This strategy can be used for fixing issues
for a single node. For example, the user may specify to add an encryption mechanism to a
specific camera on an airport.
2) Deploy on a specific number of nodes having some criteria: in this case, the planner will
try to find the first fixed number of nodes respecting the specified criteria. For example,
the user can specify that the code should be deployed on 3 nodes having at least 1 Gb of
memory to ensure HA mode for a given application.
3) Deploy on all nodes having a specific property: in this case, the planner will find all the
nodes having the specific property and deploy the application. For example, if a camera
provider puts in place a new security patch, we need to push this patch to all the nodes
containing the camera’s software.
4) Deploy on all nodes: this mechanism is similar to broadcasting code. The planner will
return all the nodes able to host the code. For example, if we need to upgrade an agent that
exists in all our nodes, we need to use this strategy to have the update applied everywhere.
3.3.5 Container Update Model
The Provisioning Unit is also responsible of organizing the container instance updates on
each resource node. To generate update steps, the Provisioning Unit takes into account two
constraints: latency criticality of the application and storage and CPU capacity of the node.
We propose several instance update strategies based on these constraints.
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Strategy 1: At most one instance running at a time In this strategy, we consider ap-
plications that tolerate small downtime. For example, smart thermostat applications that
requires temperature sensor data can tolerate certain downtime (e.g., several seconds). In
this case, first the node removes the running container, than downloads the new instance
from the registry, and finally starts the new instance. This strategy reduces the storage and
CPU consumption of the node, and it is well suited to nodes that do not have enough stor-
age or CPU to download new instance while the previous container is running. If the node
has enough storage and CPU, in order to reduce downtime, the node pulls the new instance
first and than removes running instance before starting the new one.
Strategy 2: At least one instance running at a time In this strategy, we consider appli-
cations that are latency-critical where the data is time-sensitive and even millisecond level
latencies can cause operation inefficiencies (e.g., connected cars). For such applications
update procedure should be seamless. To this end we propose installing new instance with-
out removing previous version. After starting the new version, we can just reroute the calls
to target the new instance of the deployed container. Once all the calls for the old instance
are completed we can go ahead and delete it.
3.4 Implementation
In this section, we will give a description of the implementation that we realized during
a proof of concept preparation for our work. We implemented the Foggy framework with
conformance to what we presented previously. We used 4 Raspberry Pi 3 boards model V
as our Edge devices connected to the system sensors. Each Raspberry Pi was flashed with
Hypriot OS4 to be able to host Docker5 containers [31] in order to enable our containerized
approach.




applications code within different repositories. For the continuous integration, we set up
our pipelines using an open source CI tool called Concourse 6. Concourse is based on
a declarative YAML configuration file that is easy to update when the project grows up.
Concourse also is based on containers and it is really efficient in large scale environments.
We also used the public Docker Registry to store our docker images for the different ap-
plications that we have. We setup concourse to continuously monitor the different Github
repositories, whenever a change is detected (based on the hash of the commit of the repos-
itory), the build of the code is triggered to run the different tests that we have and build a
docker image for each component and push it to the docker registry. Concourse then noti-
fies the orchestration server that there is a new version of one or more components of the
application.
The Orchestration Server is made up of different loosely coupled components. These
components are implemented as micro services exposing rest interfaces that could be de-
ployed in two different manners:
• the services could be deployed as applications on Bluemix R©, or
• they could be run as containers in any runtime that supports docker images
The Request Handler is playing the role of the mediator of queries. It receives the
notifications from concourse and determines the list of calls to do in order to accomplish
any new deployment. Its role is to transform the notification into information that the
deployment planner can understand. This component is implemented as a JAVA application
using Jersey framework to implement the REST architecture. It is a stateless application
that we can scale up or down horizontally when needed.
The Deployment Planner is also a JAVA application that contains the planning capaci-
ties of our orchestration server. The advantage of this component is its pluggability. In our
design phase we were aware that choosing an optimal distribution of the IoT components
6https://concourse.ci/
41
may change from one use case to another, we decided to make this component pluggable,
so any user can define his own by implementing the interface that we specified. If needed,
the deployment strategy can be easily changed to a more efficient one whenever we change
the context of the application. We are thinking of having different implementations of the
planning strategy, and dynamically balancing from one strategy to another according to the
events and contexts that we might face.
We also implemented the Resource Monitor component that collects monitoring data
related to the IoT devices and the running applications/containers. This component is a
JAVA application that makes use of the cAdvisor API 7 to collect data about the different
nodes that we have. cAdvisor provides data about the resource usage and performance
characteristics of the different running containers in any given node.
It is noteworthy that all of the orchestration meta-data that we have is stored in a
Cloudant database offered by Bluemix R©that is shared between the different components.
This meta-data is used to make the deployment decisions by the orchestration server. This
meta-data is also continuously evolving and being fed by the Resource Monitor that updates
the different resources usage and status.
3.5 Related Work
In recent years, with the growing popularity of its applications, IoT has gained significant
research attention [32]. One of the important directions is the design of IoT system infras-
tructures to provide a better user experience. Thousands of heterogeneous, geographically
distributed, and possibly moving devices introduce new challenges in real-time IoT appli-
cations [33]. In order to provide low-latency, minimal bandwidth consumption, and high
scalability, a new trend in IoT systems consists on processing data close to where it was
generated. [34] propose GigaSight that extends the mobile device-cloud architecture with
virtual machine-based cloudlets in order to minimize latency in mobile IoT applications.
7https://github.com/google/cadvisor
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Similarly, Cisco proposed Fog Computing model [13] in which network elements (e.g.,
gateways) extend the cloud with data processing and storage capacity close to the edge.
Such complex IoT computing infrastructure creates need for effective deployment, pro-
visioning, and resource management strategies. LEONORE [20] provides elastic provi-
sioning of IoT application components on resource constrained and heterogeneous edge
devices for large scale IoT deployment with a service oriented infrastructure. Geelytics
[35] presents an edge analytic platform that provides low latency stream processing with
optimized edge-to-cloud bandwidth consumption. Mobile Fog [36] proposes high-level
programming model for geo-distributed, latency-sensitive IoT applications. [37] presents
a service oriented resource management model for Fog infrastructure that uses customer
type-based resource estimation in order to facilitate IoT resource provisioning. All these
approaches are solely focusing on providing low latency application deployment. How-
ever, in real life IoT applications may have other requirements such as privacy protec-
tion and bandwidth usage limitation. Unlike those approaches, in Foggy, we incorporates
different application requirements in our deployment strategy. [34] and [38] takes into ac-
count privacy-preserving while providing resource provisioning in IoT environment. Satya-
narayanan et al. [34] proposed using virtual machine (VM)-based cloudlets in order to
provide privacy-aware video analytics in the three-tier architecture. However, VM-based
virtualization is not suitable for resource constraint device such as gateways. In Foggy, we
used container-based virtualization to provide flexibility and easy update.
43
CHAPTER 4
PRIVACY-PRESERVING LOCATION QUERIES FOR MOBILE TRAVELERS: A
UTILITY-AWARE AND ATTACK-RESILIENT APPROACH
Location queries provide fundamental services for many mobile travelers. Unfortunately,
continuous exposure of location information may lead to breaches of location privacy
caused by statistical inference attacks. Location privacy can be protected by spatial cloak-
ing solutions that anonymize sensitive location information to a k-anonymized spatial re-
gion of low resolution so that at least k users will issue location queries with the same per-
turbed location (location k-anonymity). However, existing spatial cloaking solutions have
two known problems: (1) the loss of location utility such as increased query cost associated
with using spatial cloaked location, and (2) vulnerability to background knowledge-based
spoofing and replay attacks, preventing wide deployment of privacy-preserving location
query systems. To address these problems, this chapter presents STARCLOAK, a utility-
aware and attack-resilient approach to privacy-preserving location queries for mobile trav-
elers on road networks. STARCLOAK is novel in three aspects: (1) It incorporates spatial
and temporal location utility constraints as an integral part of its location anonymization
model, ensuring the query utility of anonymized locations; (2) its privacy-preserving lo-
cation query algorithms minimize additional end-to-end latency introduced by anonymous
query processing; (3) it embeds in its location anonymization process robust defense ca-
pabilities that protect spatially cloaked locations from sophisticated attacks based on back-
ground knowledge such as correlation-based replay attacks and query injection-based at-
tacks. Extensive experiments show that STARCLOAK can effectively integrate spatial and
temporal location utility constraint, anonymous query processing cost, and complex lo-
cation inference attacks with high query cost-efficiency and strong attack resilience for
scaling anonymous location queries.
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4.1 Introduction
The growth of location-based services (LBSs) is fueled by the ubiquitous wireless connec-
tivity, the universal presence of smart mobile devices with multi-modal sensing capability,
and increased investments from industry and government on the Internet of Things (IoT).
Juniper Research [4] forecasts that the LBS market will reach $43.3 billion in revenue
by 2019, rising from an estimated $12.2 billion in 2014. [5] reports that %74 of adult
smartphone owners use their phones to get direction or information based on their cur-
rent locations. As more and more mobile travelers and vehicles are connected continuously
and automatically, we are embraced by many life-enriching location-based experiences and
services (e.g., improved emergency assistance, real-time traffic alerts). However, for many
location-based services and mobile data management applications, location queries are the
fundamental functionality and continuous location exposure opens doors to the intrusion
of location privacy [6]. For example, even if users identifiers are removed from their lo-
cation queries, successive position updates can be linked to identify individuals with high
confidence. Unauthorized trajectory exposure may also expose mobile users of LBSs to
significant vulnerabilities for abuse such as unwanted advertisement, stalking, and location
spoofing. In addition, when private location data of a mobile user is linked to sensitive
public locations such as mental health clinics, cancer treatment centers, nightclubs, and
religious organizations, such unauthorized location - identity linkage may cause ethical,
professional, and social risks to both individuals and our society at large.
Over the last decade, research on location privacy has gained increased attentions. We
classify location privacy research and development into three broad categories. The first
is policy-based solutions that restrict unauthorized access to location data through privacy
policies that typically provide an option for users to turn off location-based services or to
block tracking. The second category consist of mix-zone based approaches [39, 40], which
protect location privacy by changing pseudonyms at selected locations in so that an attacker
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cannot infer mapping between old and new pseudonyms of mobile users, thus protecting
the location-identity linking attacks. Mix-zones are effective for LBSs that require iden-
tity or pseudonyms of mobile users. The third category is based on location obfuscation
models and algorithms. Unlike mix-zone approaches, location-obfuscation approaches are
targeted at applications that do not require true identities or pseudo-identities of mobile
users. Examples of such applications are finding nearby gas stations or restaurants or noti-
fying a user about the traffic conditions when the user is approaching Piedmont Hospital in
Atlanta.
The most representative location obfuscation approaches are location k-anonymization
and differential location privacy. Location k-anonymization techniques hide the exact lo-
cation of a mobile user by replacing it with a k-anonymized cloaking region in user’s lo-
cation query, which guarantees that at least k mobile users share the same cloaked region
as their published location. A subject is considered location k - anonymous if its loca-
tion is indistinguishable from k − 1 other users’ location [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Research in
differential location privacy [41, 42, 43] extends differential privacy theory [44] by us-
ing geo-indistinguishability for location perturbation, which transforms the actual location
point of a mobile user to a random pseudo-location that is geographically close to the ac-
tual location point and guarantees that the original and the perturbed-location points have
similar probabilities to generate the same pseudo-location.
The research presented in this chapter falls into the location-obfuscation category. We
argue that both location k-anonymization algorithms and differential location privacy al-
gorithms suffer from a number of known problems: (1) Most existing algorithms compute
the anonymized location solely based on specific location-privacy metric or metrics. Very
few of these algorithms has incorporated location utility and location query cost into con-
sideration in their spatial cloaking decisions. (2) Most existing location privacy algorithms
are vulnerable to complex replay attacks such as correlation- and query injection-based
attacks. (3) Most existing solutions develop spatial obfuscation techniques based on the
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random waypoint mobility model [11, 12], in which mobile travelers move in arbitrary di-
rections at random speed. These solutions fail to address privacy risks when mobile users
traveling in a spatially constrained environment such as a road network in which both user
mobility and location query processing are constrained by the underlying road network.
For example, as a spatial cloaking region may contain a single road segment when we use
rectangle-based spatial cloaking techniques, they are vulnerable because adversaries can
easily track the whereabouts of mobile users.
In this work, we present STARCLOAK, a query utility-aware and attack-resilient ap-
proach to building a privacy-preserving location query system for mobile users traveling
on the road networks. The design of the STARCLOAK is novel in three aspects. One is
that it incorporates spatial and temporal location utility constraints as an integral part of
its location anonymization model, ensuring the query utility of anonymized locations. In
addition, its privacy-preserving location query algorithms minimize additional end-to-end
latency introduced by anonymous query processing. We argue that a spatially-cloaked lo-
cation should be computed by maximizing location privacy and minimizing location query
cost introduced by anonymization. Last but not least, we formally study some sophisticated
background knowledge-based attack models such as correlation-based replay attacks and
query injection-based attacks and provide analytical models to quantitatively evaluate the
attack resilience of our location anonymization algorithms with respect to spatially-cloaked
locations. We evaluate STARCLOAK through extensive experiments and simulation on road
networks with varying scales of mobile users. To the best of our knowledge, STARCLOAK
is the first privacy-preserving location query system that generates anonymous location
queries by integrating location utility constraints, anonymous query processing costs, and
location inference attack resilience.
4.2 STARCLOAK Overview
STARCLOAK can be viewed as a trusted third-party location anonymization service. It
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serves location privacy protection that forms as a middle layer between mobile users and
their untrusted LBS providers and performs location anonymization for mobile users. Mo-
bile travelers who wish to protect their location queries from location spoofing attacks may
register to the STARCLOAK. Assume that mobile user Alice issues a location query while
she is moving along a certain road segment. Without STARCLOAK, the location query
service on Alice′s mobile client will directly send her location query with her current posi-
tion to an untrusted LBS provider that executes a query based on her location information
and returns the results to her mobile client. However, STARCLOAK will first compute the
anonymized location and then replace Alice′s exact location before it sends her query to
the untrusted third-party LBS provider. Then it will filter anonymous location query results
and return actual location results to Alice′s mobile client. All of these steps are executed
transparently from mobile users like Alice. This section presents an overview of STAR-
CLOAK, describes utility-preserving spatial cloaking algorithms, and provides a formal
analysis of its attack resilience in subsequent sections. We assume that mobile users travel
on spatially constrained road networks or walk paths. Thus, we first introduce the basic
concepts and models for the road networks, location privacy and location queries, followed



















Figure 4.1: A road network model.
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4.2.1 Road Network Model
This work presents a model of a road network as undirected graph G = (VG, EG) with the
node set VG and the edge set EG, representing road junctions (nodes) and road segments
(edges), respectively. Each road segment connects a pair of junctions. Figure 4.1 illustrates
a road network. We use dG(v) to denote the degree of a node v with respect to the graph G,
dG(v) = |{w|(v, w) ∈ EG}|. We call v an intersection node if dG(v) ≥ 3, an connection
node if dG(v) = 2, and an end node if dG(v) = 1. In Figure 4.1, v5 is an intersection node
and v1 a connection node. An anonymized location in the road network environment is a
subgraph that can be define as follow;
Definition 1 (Subgraph) S is a subgraph of the road networkG, denoted by S =< VS, ES >,
if and only if VS ⊂ VG and ES ⊂ EG.
This definition allows a subgraph S with some isolated nodes that have no connection
(edges) to any nodes outside the subgraph S. This introduce a new concept, the border
node, defined as follows;
Definition 2 (Border Node) Let S denote a sub-graph of road network G. The set of
border nodes of S, denoted by BV(S), are nodes in both S and G but have edges that are
not in EG but in ES , or no edges between any nodes that are in VG, not in S. The equation
that represents border nodes follows:
BV(S) = {v|∀v ∈ VS, dG(v) ≥ dS(v),∃w ∈ (VG − VS), (v, w) /∈ ES}
For example, Figure 4.5b illustrates subgraph S with VS = {v2, v4, v5, v6, v7, v10} and
ES = {v4v5, v5v10, v5v6, v6v7, v6v2}. The border node set of S is given by BV(S) =
{v2, v4, v7, v10}.
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4.2.2 Utility-aware Location Privacy Model
STARCLOAK assures the location privacy of mobile travelers in terms of both privacy and
utility metrics. We promote personalized (customizable) location k-user anonymity and
location l-segment indistinguishability to measure the resilience of a location anonymiza-
tion algorithm against location spoofing attacks. In addition, we introduce two location
utility metrics: minimal spatial and temporal cloaking resolutions. These utility metrics
serve dual purposes: (1) They capture the spatial and temporal location utility desired by
mobile travelers who need location-based services from respective LBS providers, and (2)
they constrain and regulate STARCLOAK so that it perform location anonymization while
meeting the spatial and temporal resolution (utility) constraints.
Privacy-aware Preprocessing. Given the assumption that mobile users are moving
along the pre-defined spatial network (roads), we observed two cases: First, end nodes are
more sensitive since they usually represents semantic locations such as residential houses
and hospitals; and second, connection nodes (i.e., nodes with degree of two) do not con-
tribute to location privacy protection. Because, an attacker can infer mobile users’ future
and past locations among the sequence of segments linked by connection nodes. After all,
it is unlikely that mobile users make U-turns in the middle of the road. Therefore, we
remove all end nodes and merge all connection nodes during the preprocessing step. Af-
ter this step, a sequence of edges (v0v1, . . ., vivi+1, . . ., vL−1vL) in which (vi 6= vj) are
merged into one road segment, denoted by (v0vL), in which dG(v0) ≥ 3, dG(vL) ≥ 3, and
dG(vi) = 2 for 0 < i < L. Consequently, a road network G is uniquely partitioned into a
set of road segments each represented by its two end points (intersection nodes), and when
no confusion occurs v0 . . . vL is also presented as (v0, vL).
Location anonymization by location perturbation (obfuscation) refers to the location
transformation process, which translates an exact location into another geometric location
of lower resolution that preserves user-defined location privacy requirements. Examples of
such perturbed locations are a rectangle geometric region [7, 8] or a subgraph of a road net-
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work [bamba:2015, 45]. One criterion for utility preserving location anonymization is the
location cloaking capability, which produces privacy preserving location anonymization
with minimal loss of location utility and minimal overhead of anonymous location-query
processing. The first location privacy metric is location k-user anonymity, which ensures
the location indistinguishability of a specific mobile user among a set of k users (i.e., anony-
mous set of size k). Instead of using a system-supplied k for all users and all queries [46],
we advocate personalized (customizable) location k-user anonymity [7], enabling various
settings of k for users and their queries.
Definition 3 (Location k-user anonymity) Let S denote the published location for a mo-
bile user u with respect to a query q. Let Lq denote the focal location of the location query
q. If at least (k − 1) other active users have the same published location S as user u,
the published location S is k-anonymous with respect to u, q and k. We use δk to denote
the achieved location k-anonymity. Formally, given k, Lq, and u, the output of location
anonymization, S, with a k-anonymity guarantee satisfies the following conditions:
• S is a subgraph of the road network G.
• δk users have Lq1 , Lq2 , . . . , Lqk as their location points on some segments in S. Let
AnonymousSet(S) denote the δk users, each described by (ui, Lqi , ku,q) (1 ≤ i ≤ δk),
in which ui denotes the user’s identity, Lqi denotes the query focal location, and ku,q
denotes the personalized k defined by user u with respect to query q. The maximum k
in AnonymousSet(S) is not more than δk, that is, ∀(u, Lq, ku,q) ∈ AnonymousSet(S),
δk ≥ ku,q.
• All δk users publish the same S as their anonymized location. Each user query q is
transformed into anonymous query qA by using S to replace their exact query focal
location Lqi (1 ≤ i ≤ δk).
Location k-user anonymity hides the actual location of user u in an anonymous location
shared by at least other k − 1 users in the vicinity of u, which makes it harder for an ad-
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versary to distinguish u from the other k− 1 users based on published anonymous location
S. Location-cloaking algorithms use various computation models to find k-anonymized
location S based on the actual location of user u with respect to query q. In Section 4.2.6,
we will compare the STARCLOAK approach to existing cloaking methods and analyze its
superiority with regard to both location privacy and utility.
The second location privacy metric is location l-segment indistinguishability. It is
known that location k-anonymity fails to prevent the linking of user u to a sensitive pub-
lic location on the road network with high probability. We assume that users of queries
q1 and q2 published their 2-anonymized location as A1 and A2, respectively, illustrated in
Figure 4.1. Even though both spatially cloaked locations meet the location k-anonymity,
an adversary more easily tracks the whereabouts of user u1 than those of the user u2, since
q1 is associated with a single road segment v5v6 in A1 with 100% confidence. However, q2,
with published location A2, is associated with any of the three segments in A2 with equal
probability. This example demonstrates that in order to protect the sensitive location infor-
mation of mobile users traveling on the road network from unauthorized privacy leakages,
location privacy should be defined and measured by both location k-user anonymity and
location l-segment indistinguishability (k > 1, l > 1).
Definition 4 (Location l-segment indistinguishability) Anonymized location S for a user
u with respect to query q is l-segment indistinguishable, if S contains at least lu,q road seg-
ments such that the association of any of the lu,q segments to with user u and query q is
indistinguishable from the other lu,q−1 segments. We use δl to denote the achieved location
l-indistinguishability. Formally, given l, Lq, and u, the output of location anonymization S
with a location l-indistinguishability guarantee satisfies the following conditions:
• S is a subgraph of the road network G.
• Let lu,q denote the personalized l, defined by user u with respect to query q, and each
user in AnonymousSet(S) is represented by (u, q, lu,q). Anonymized location S must
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contain δl distinct road segments, where δl is the maximum l in AnonymousSet(S)
such that ∀(u, Lq, lu,q) ∈ AnonymousSet(S), δl ≥ lu,q.
We refer to (δk, δl) as the unified location privacy measures that should be achieved by loca-
tion anonymization algorithms to meet the user-defined (k, l) location privacy requirements
(k-user anonymity and l-segment indistinguishability).
In addition to the two location privacy metrics, we formally introduce two location
utility metrics defined by maximum spatial utility, σs, and maximum temporal utility, σt.
The spatial utility (σs) bounds the spatial resolution of the anonymized location, allowing
the location-cloaking algorithm to limit the spatial cloaking resolution reduction under the
upper bound. The temporal utility (σt) bounds the maximum time delay resulting from
the location anonymization operation, prompting the location cloaking algorithm to utilize
this temporal upper bound to increase the success rate of location anonymization under
user-defined spatial utility constraint σs. If a location query q cannot be anonymized under
spatial utility constraint σs and temporal utility constraint σt, then q is discarded (failed)
because of the spatial or temporal utility constraint violation.
Definition 5 (Utility-aware Anonymization) Let q denote a location query with focal lo-
cation Lq issued by mobile user u. Let (k, l, st, tt) denote the user-defined privacy and
utility constraints with respect to query q. The utility-aware location anonymization trans-
forms the exact location, Lq, associated with query q to a spatially cloaked location S
with (δk, δl, σs, σt), and guarantees that S satisfies location k-user anonymity (δk ≥ k),
location l-segment indistinguishability (δl ≥ l) while preserving both the spatial resolution
constraint (σs ≤ st) and the temporal resolution constraint (σt ≤ tt). Formally, given
Lq and u with (k, l, st, tt), S with (δk, δl, σs, σt) are the output of utility aware location
anonymization with k-anonymity and l-indistinguishability guarantees, satisfying the fol-
lowing conditions:
• S is a subgraph of the road network G, and S meets location privacy defined by
location k-user anonymity and location l-segment indistinguishability.
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• Let stu,q and ttu,q denote the spatial and temporal resolution constraints defined by
user u with respect to query q. Let AnonymousSet(S) denote the δk users, each (u, q)
is associated with the user-defined privacy constraints (ku,q and lu,q) and the utility
constraints (stu,q and ttu,q)), such that ∀(u, q) ∈ AnonymousSet(S), σs ≤ su,q and
σt ≤ tu,q.
The spatial utility metric, using the cloaked location, defines the maximum spatial
resolution reduction, which is tolerated for executing q. Similarly, the temporal utility
metric states the maximum temporal delay, allowed without exceeding the user-defined
deadline threshold for location query q. We call (σs, σt) the achieved utility guarantee
for anonymized location S, computed by the location-anonymization algorithm. By intro-
ducing spatial cloaking tolerance and temporal cloaking tolerance as the two utility con-
straints, we allow mobile travelers to define their preferred spatial and temporal resolution
of an anonymized location based on the type of location queries and their preferred lo-
cation utility. Location anonymization algorithms can differ in terms of both privacy and
utility metrics. Even algorithms that preserve the same privacy metrics and utility metrics
differ in terms of three factors: (i) risk resilience of their location privacy guarantee, (ii)
spatial-temporal resolution losses of their location utility, and (iii) cost of anonymous query
processing that result from different sizes and graph compactness of anonymized location
S.
In the next two sections, we describe two baseline location-anonymization algorithms,
introduce the cost model for anonymous query processing, and show that both baseline al-
gorithms meet the two location privacy metrics and the two location utility metrics. How-
ever, they differ significantly in terms of privacy risk resilience, utility losses, and anony-
mous query processing costs, the main motivation for the design and development of the
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Figure 4.2: Overall architecture of STARCLOAK.
4.2.3 Anonymous Location-based Service Architecture
Figure 4.2 illustrates the reference anonymous query processing architecture. Let q denote
the original query by user u with location Lq and qA the anonymous query of q by replacing
exact location Lq with cloaked location S under user-defined anonymization constraints (k,
l, st, tt). With location privacy protection by anonymization, LBS requests from mobile
travelers are transformed into anonymous queries before they are relayed to the respective
LSB provider. The system architecture for anonymous location query processing consists
of a sequence of four data flows: First, a mobile client sends location query request q with
focal location Lq to the intended LBS provider, and given that user u has subscribed to a
location anonymization service (e.g., STARCLOAK), the anonymization agent will intercept
location query q of a mobile client, and after performing location sanitization, the agent will
relay the anonymized query. Such a relay process can be done by either an anonymization
server or an anonymization agent on mobile clients, depending on the choice of a concrete
anonymization service.
In the second flow, the location anonymization engine, upon receiving a location anonymiza-
tion request, computes the anonymized location S for query q and generates anonymized
query qA with S as the anonymized focal location of user u with respect to query q and
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relays anonymous query qA with S to the LBS provider. Following this flow, the LBS
provider computes anonymous location query qA in the same way as it did the regular loca-
tion queries and returns the results to the relay agent of the anonymization service such as
STARCLOAK. Given that the anonymized location has a lower resolution than the original
query focal location, the result set of qA may be much larger and contain a large number
of false positives. Finally, the relay agent will perform post-processing of the results of qA
to filter all false positives and deliver the exact query answer with respect to original focal
location Lq to mobile user u.
In STARCLOAK, we use a trusted third-party anonymization server model to provide
anonymized location S with an l-segment indistinguishability guarantee. As such a guar-
antee can be satisfied by only accurate road network data, which is usually too large for
mobile clients to store. A request handler unit in the STARCLOAK location anonymization
engine is responsible for communicating with mobile users and preparing queries for the
anonymization process. We explained the preprocessing step in Section 4.3.3. The cloak-
ing engine generates anonymized locations in two units: a candidate subgraph generator
and a cloaked subgraph pruner (Sections 4.3.4 to 4.3.8). The anonymous query handler
unit communicates with an LBS provider. Finally, the query result filter unit removes false
positive results from the result set returned by the LBS provider.
Providing privacy of mobile users introduces time delay and additional network usage,
thus it affects their overall experience using location-based services. The anonymization
process and anonymous query evaluation are the most dominant factors of the time de-
lay in privacy protection architectures. False positive results, the consequence of using
an anonymized location, cause additional network usage. An important goal of a location
anonymization system is to minimize these effects. An optimal location anonymization
system generates an anonymized location S with the following properties: (1) It satisfies
user-defined privacy (k, l) and utility constraints (st, tt); (2) It is found whenever k users
can be cloaked; (3) for any other cloaked location S ′ (S ′ 6= S) that satisfies (k, l, st, tt),
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anonymous query qA with cloaked location S has the lowest evaluation cost; (4) it causes
a minimum number of false positives; (5) it has strong resilience against inference attacks
that adversaries may instigate. In Section 4.5.2 we introduce metrics for evaluating the op-
timality of anonymization systems. In the next two sections, we will formalize anonymous
processing costs and provide s set of inference attacks.
4.2.4 Anonymous Query Cost Model
One of the main challenges for finding optimal location anonymization output S such that
privacy preserving location query qA with S as its anonymized location will have the low-
est cost. This operation requires that the location anonymization algorithms account for
query-processing and communication costs when choosing a spatially cloaked location to
anonymize the actual focal location of a query. Thus, the STARCLOAK anonymization
algorithms are constrained by anonymous query costs.
Cost of Anonymous Query Evaluation
Most state-of-the-art query processing approaches for road networks [47, 48, 49, 50, 51] are
based on two types of fundamental operations: edge and node. However, these approaches
differ with regard to their assumptions. We formalize the cost models for anonymous query
processing based on the cost of the edge and node operations.
The edge-based operation takes a query q and an edge e as input and returns a set
of objects on e, which satisfies the query condition denoted by Oe(q, e). As the most
fundamental operation, most query processing techniques construct indexing structures to
speed-up edge-based operations. For a segment s composed by a sequence of edges, if we
denote Os(q, s) as the set of objects matching q on s, we obtain Os(q, s) = ∪e∈sOe(q, e).
We use Cs to denote the average computation cost, in terms of both CPU and IO, of eval-
uating segment-based query. Cs depends on the number of edges, length of the edges, the
number of objects on the edges, the predicate condition of the query, and the underlying
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system implementation, such as edge indexing and caching mechanisms. In our current
system, we set Cs statically according to the underlying implementation (e.g., fast look-up
table, R-Tree, etc), assuming the condition of average edge length, average object density
and no specific predicate, though finer model can be developed, which we consider as our
future work.
The node-based operation takes a query q and a node v as input and returns the set
of objects in the vicinity of v, which satisfies the query condition denoted by Ov(q, v),
in which v ∈ VG. The computation cost of evaluating a node-based query denoted by
Cv. Similar to edge-based operations, besides the properties of the spatial network and the
predicate of each individual query, Cv also varies from the implementation: In dynamic
network expansion [51], evaluating a node-based query usually involves multiple edge-
based operations, hence Cv > Cs; While in solution indexing [49], the query result is
cached to speed-up this operation, and evaluating a node-based query involves a simple
structure look-up operation, therefore Cv ≈ Cs. In our current system, we set Cv according
to the underlying implementation and the average condition of the spatial network and no
specific predicates.
Theorem 1 Let q denote a query issued at some position p on segment s and vsb and vse as
the two ends of s. The exact query resultR(q, p) is in the union of two parts: (1) matching
objects on the segment s; (2) results of the query on both end of s, formulated as follows:
R(q, s) ⊆ Os(q, s) ∪ Ov(q, vsb) ∪ Ov(q, vse)
The proof of this theorem is straightforward and omitted here. Figure 4.3 gives an
illustrative example of anonymous query processing on road network. A k-NN query q
with k = 3 is issued by a user u locating on the segment v5v6. The exact answer for query q
is R(q, p) = {o5, o6, o7}, which is included in the union ofOe(q, v5v6) = {o5, o6},Ov(q, v5)






















Figure 4.3: Illustration of query processing on road networks.
We extend the query processing model for single segment anonymous location to the set
of segments S by employing the concept of border nodes (See Definition 2). Concretely,
the query result of q with S as its spatially cloaked location is a subset of the union of
(1) the set of matching objects on the segments of S, i.e., ∪s∈SOs(q, s) and (2) the set of
matching objects on the border nodes of S , i.e., ∪v∈BV (S)Ov(q, v). Formally,




Finally, with this model, the evaluation cost of anonymous query q with cloaked loca-
tion S, denoted by Costeval(S), can be estimated as follows:
Costeval(q,S) = Cv × |BV (S)|+Cs × |S| (4.1)
in which |BV | denote the number of border nodes in the anonymized location S and |S|
denote the number of segments in S.
Cost of Communication Cost
In Section 4.2.3 we present reference anonymous query processing architecture and data
flow in four communication phases. We analyze the cost of communication in these four
phases respectively. Specifically, we focus on the ”optimizable” communication, i.e., the
cost that varies from the performed location anonymization technique. We measure the cost
as the length of the sent and received messages, and use ‖x‖ denote the encoded length of
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an object x. For a given query q , the communication cost in Phase I and IV are not usually
not optimizable, since each service request usually takes fixed encoded format, e.g., query
ID, query parameters, etc; and the size of the exact answer to q is fixed, for a given database.
Therefore, we focus on the communication cost in Phase II and III.
In Phase II, the query remains intact while the location information is sanitized as
a set of segments S, therefore the communication cost is: Costcomm−II = ‖q‖+‖S‖;
In Phase III, the candidate result R(q, S) is returned with the communication cost as
Costcomm−III = ‖R(q, S)‖. As discussed above, a query q usually takes fixed length.
Also, for given location privacy requirements, k-user anonymity and l-segment indistin-
guishability, the number of segments in S tends to be fairly stable. ThereforeCostcomm−III
is the major ”optimizable” cost, which can vary significantly depending on the performed
anonymization algorithm, and we consider as the dominant communication cost.
As discussed in Section 4.2.4, given a location query q and the set of segments S, the
size of the candidate resultR(q, S) can be estimated as:






where the first term corresponds to the result size of a query over the boundary nodes of S,
and the second term represents all the objects on the edges of S. LetR be the average result
size for the query over the node (R = k for the k-NN queries), ρo be the average number of
object on an edge, and Co be the cost of sending/receiving an object o. The communication












Overall Anonymous Query Cost
Given the estimation of the query evaluation cost and the communication cost in Equation
4.1 and 4.2, it is desired to combine them to give an estimation of the overall cost. In this
work, we consider a linear combination scheme:
Cost(S) = λ.Costcomm(S) + (1− λ).Costeval(S) (4.3)
where λ is the parameter tinning the trade-off between the evaluation cost (mainly CPU
computation at the server side), and the communication cost (mainly bandwidth of wireless
channel).
4.2.5 Inference Attack Models
The strength of location privacy techniques depends on the attacker’s level of confidence
in his estimation of the user’s exact location. Specifically, in the road network-based lo-
cation obfuscation systems, the goal of the adversary is to identify probabilities of each
segment in anonymous location S to be the user’s actual segment. Ideally, each segment in
S is indistinguishable to the adversaries. In other words, associativity of the mobile user
with the segments follows a uniform distribution (i.e., with equal probability 1/|S|). How-
ever, with available background knowledge attacker can associate user to a certain segment
with higher probability. In order to formalize attacker’s confidence we used the notion of
Linkability [45]:
Definition 6 (Linkability) For a user u, with published location information as a set of
segments S, Linkability Link(u, s, S,KB) is the probability that an adversary can infer
based on S and background knowledge KB that u is associated with the segment s.
The background knowledge particularly addressed here includes (1) the location anonymiza-
tion algorithm, (2) the underlying road network structure, and (3) the estimation of overall
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query cost (Section 4.2.4) of each segment. In this work, we primarily focused on snapshot
queries. The ability to correlate multiple locations with single user in continues queries in-
crease attacker’s chance significantly to infer user’s exact location [52]. While addressing
privacy breach in continuous queries is an important direction and our ongoing work, we
limit our scope in this work with snapshot queries. Following, we present General Replay
Attack [45], Correlation-based Replay Attack, and Query Injection Attack. These attack
models used as a resilience measure of the location anonymization algorithms.
General Replay Attack
In the replay attack the adversary is given the set of segments S and attempts to perform
reverse engineering, with her understanding the sanitation algorithm. Specifically, the ad-
versary re-runs the anonymization algorithm, A(·), for each segment s ∈ S assumed to
be the mobile user’s original location. The similarity between S and the segment set, S ′,
generated with replay attack model is used as a metric to estimate the likelihood of s to
generates the anonymous location S:
Like[S|u← s,KB] =
|S ′ ∩ S|
|S|





The segment with highest linkability value selected as an estimated location of the
mobile user. Algorithm 1 shows the details of the general replay attack model. Starting
from each segment (line 2), until the number of segments in S ′ is reach to the size of the
anonymous location S, one incrementally add new segments using anonymization algo-
rithm A(|S ′|) (lines 3-4). The likelihood and linkability values calculated in lines 5 and
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6, respectively. The segment with the highest linkability value return as the output of the
replay attack (line 7).
ALGORITHM 1: Basic Replay Attack
Input: the set of segments S, the anonymization algorithm A(·)
Output: the maximum linkability value
1 for each s ∈ S do
2 S′ ← {s};
3 while |S′|< |S| do
4 add new segment(s) to S′ with A(|S′|);
5 calculate L[S,Kad|u← s] = |S
′∩S|
|S| ;
6 calculate Link[u← s|§,Kad] = L[S,Kad|u←s]∑
s′∈S L[S,Kad|u←s′]
;
7 output s|maxs Link[u← s|S,Kad];
Correlation-based Replay Attack
The basic idea of road network based anonymization is to add extra segments in addition to
the original segment that user resides to form the anonymous location S until it satisfies all
users’ privacy requirements (Section 4.2.2). We classify such algorithms in two categories
based on the new segment selection mechanism. In the first category, algorithms selects a
new segment to add anonymous location S with predefined segment selection mechanism
only. Random Sampling and Network Expansion 4.2.6 are examples of this category. In
the second category, the decision to select a segment to add anonymous location require
to take into consideration other queries reside on the new segment. For example, XStar
[45] enlarge anonymous location S with new star if and only if the star contains at least
one active query. However, general replay attack model does not consider this distinction
and calculates likelihood for each segment based on the road network structure only. To
overcome this deficiency, in our new attack model we incorporate the placement of other
(k − 1) queries on the cloaked subgraph S to the general replay attack model. In this
case, likelihood of s is the sum of all likelihood values for each possible placement of the
(k − 1) queries over S. Let S is the multiset, we define all possible placements, M , as
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a list of (k − 1)-multisubset. Suppose that mi ← S shows the selected segments for the
mutisubset mi ∈M , likelihood can be calculated as:
Like[S|u← s∗, Kad] =
(( Sk−1))∑
i=1
Like[S|u← s∗,mi ← S,Kad]
In addition to background knowledge described earlier we also considered stronger at-
tacker that has additional knowledge about mobile users distribution over road-network.
Correlation-based replay attack make it possible to include this information to quantify
adversaries success. We, first, calculate the relative probabilities p(s) based on the pop-
ularities of each segment and each multisubset’s probabilities p(m). Finally, during the
likelihood calculation we used this probabilities as follows:
Like[S|u← s∗, Kad] =
(( Sk−1))∑
i=1
p(s∗).p(mi).Like[S|u← s∗,mi ← S,Kad]
Query Injection Attack
So far we assume that attacker is an observer only and does not have knowledge about any
user’s location in the k-anonymous cloaked region S. In this attack model, we also consider
the case where the attacker play active role and can inject dummy queries into the system.
Although anonymized location S may not satisfy user k-anonymity anymore, effective road
network based obfuscation algorithms continue to satisfy segment l-indistinguishability
requirement.
Anonymization algorithms with strong relationship between generated cloaked region
and query issued locations, are vulnerable against query injection attack. For instance, in
XSTAR during the super star construction step new star selected if and only if it includes
at least one active query and all queries belongs the same star should cloak together. This


















Figure 4.4: Query Injection Example
graph with bold lines for three queries. Suppose that attacker send two fake queries, q1
and q2 with (δk, δs)=(3,3) privacy requirements. Due to the nature of the XSTAR algo-
rithm, attacker infers that third query issued from either segment n4n5 or n4n10. In order
to measure the effectiveness of the anonymization algorithm respect to query injection at-
tack we slightly modify the likelihood calculation in the correlation-based replay attack.
In this case, we assign zero to the likelihood value for the multisubset mi ∈ M , if the
corresponding segments S conflicts with the known queries location.
On the other hand, in STARCLOAK depend on the third user’s segment diversity re-
quirement it is possible to be on any of the segments in S. Note that we assumed that
privacy requirements sent anonymization server with secure channel and attacker do not
have this information.
4.2.6 Baseline Anonymization Models
In this section, we motivate the design of STARCLOAK by presenting two baseline loca-
tion anonymization models, random sampling and network expansion, represent two ends
of the spectrum for utility-aware location-anonymization with privacy (k, l) and utility



































Figure 4.5: Baseline location-anonymization models.
Location Anonymization by Random Sampling
Let q denote a user query with privacy constraint (kq, lq) and utility constraints (ssq, ttq).
This approach samples one segment with random from the spatial region defined by ssq and
adds it to the anonymous location S of q. The process continues until the two privacy re-
quirements (kq, lq) are satisfied. Figure 4.5a shows the anonymization result of an example
query q with (kq, lq) = (5, 5). By Random Sampling scheme, four additional segments are
selected randomly, each containing an active user query, in addition to the original segment
v5v6} to which query q by user u is associated. Selected segments shown with bold edges
in Figure 4.5a.
The strength of random sampling scheme is its high resilience against statistical in-
ference attacks since the set of segments is selected with random under the spatial utility
constraint. However, the weakness of the scheme is the high anonymous query processing
cost using the cloaked region S with at least l segments and a large number of border nodes,
|BV |≥ 2 × l in the worst case scenario. Thus, the query processing cost corresponds to
issuing l or more queries at different locations, leading to high query processing cost as l
and k increases.
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Location Anonymization by Network Expansion
In contrast to random sampling, network expansion represents another end of the spectrum
of location anonymization algorithms, namely, one can perturb the focal location point
of query q using a network expansion algorithm [51]. It starts from the segment on which
query q is issued, say v5v6}. Following Dijkstra’s algorithm, we incrementally add a neigh-
boring segment, ordered by their network distances (mid points) to q’s focal position. The
process terminates when q’s privacy requirements defined by (k, l) are met. In Figure 4.5b,
four segments with the minimum network distance to q’s focal position are added incre-
mentally into S, which defines q’s anonymized location. The Network Expansion scheme
results in a set of segments connected via a densely compact subgraph structure. The ad-
vantage of this scheme is the minimal query processing cost, as the number of border nodes
grows sublinearly with the number of segments [51]. The main weakness of this scheme
is the vulnerability against replay attack as the expansion process follows a deterministic
best-first search strategy, which can be potentially exploited by an adversary to perform a
reverse-engineering attack.
From these two naive baseline anonymization schemes, we observe that even with
utility-aware location anonymizaiton, there may exist multiple anonymized locations that
meet both privacy metrics (k, l) and utility metrics (st, tt). Thus, we employ a query-cost
based optimization to select the spatially cloaked location that will generate the cheapest
query cost.
4.2.7 Solution Approach
Based on the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the two baseline anonymization
methods, we demonstrate that simply meeting the two location privacy metrics and the two
location utility metrics is insufficient to address the problem of utility-aware and attack
resilient location anonymization. For example, anonymization solutions that satisfy both
location privacy metrics and location utility metrics, such as random sampling and network
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expansion, may fail to provide location anonymization that offers both strong privacy guar-
antee and low cost of anonymous query processing. A key challenge is that high utility and
high privacy are conflicting goals. The random sampling based anonymization achieves
the strong resilience against location spoofing attacks by paying the high cost of anony-
mous query processing, whereas the network expansion based anonymization achieves low
processing cost for anonymous queries by employing Dijkstra’s deterministic network ex-
pansion, making it vulnerable to replay attacks and various background knowledge based
attacks. Thus, we argue that an effective location anonymization algorithm should aim at
achieving an optimal balance between low query processing cost, high spatial-temporal
location utility, and high privacy risk resilience. Concretely, adding certain amount of ran-
domness in the baseline network expansion approach can allievate the problem of determin-
istic expansion, which is a main cause of vulnerability for replay attacks with background
knowledge. By adding random noise into the location anonymizaiton decision process,
we can introduce non-deterministic nature into the location cloaking computation, which
strengthens the attack resilience of both the computation model of the anonymization al-
gorithm and its anonymized location output. However, adequate control of the amount of
random noises is required to avoid the high cost of anonymous query processing resulting
from the random sampling based approach.
Bearing the above analysis in mind, we formulate the problem of utility-aware and
attack resilient location anonymization in the STARCLOAK system as follows:
Definition 7 (Utility-aware and attack-resilient Anonymization)
Let q denote a location query with focal location Lq issued by a mobile user u. Let (k,
l, st, tt) denote the user-defined privacy and utility constraints with respect to query q.
We define that the location anonymization is a process that transforms the exact location
Lq associated with query q to a cloaked location S and the achieved privacy and utility
measures (δk, δl, σs, σt) associated with S. We say that a location anonymization algorithm,
denoted by α, is utility-aware and attack resilient if and only if (iff) the following conditions
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hold:
1. S is a subgraph of the road network G;
2. S satisfies location k user anonymity (δk ≥ k), location l segment-indistinguishability
(δl ≥ l);
3. S preserves both spatial resolution constraint (σs ≤ st) and temporal resolution
constraint (σt ≤ tt);
4. Let S is the anonymized location output of the algorithm α. S is the optimal cloak-
ing location with respect to the best balance between high location utility with low
anonymous query processing cost and strong privacy with high attack resilience. For-
mally, let AS denote the set of candidate cloaked locations. S satisfies the following
condition: ∀S ∈ AS , costtotal costαtotal(S) ≤ costαtotal(S).
This problem statement amounts to say that a location anonymization algorithm delivers
an optimal balance between location privacy guarantee and location utility guarantee. The
location privacy guarantee should satisfy user-defined location privacy metrics and offer
strong attack resilience to the location privacy guarantee provided. The location utility
guarantee should meet the user-desired spatial and temporal utility bounds and ensure the
low cost of anonymous query processing.
Given that the cost of anonymous query processing is a function of the size of the border
nodes, |BV (S)|, and the size of the edge set of anonymized focal location |S|, in the de-
sign of STARCLOAK location anonymization algorithm, we focus on developing controlled
randomness in each anonymization step of the neighborhood expansion, while minimizing
the size of the border node set and the edge set of S. STARCLOAK achieves these objec-
tives from three novel aspects. First, STARCLOAK introduces star-graph, a road-junction
based abstraction and a cost-aware randomness in road-junction based expansion process
to reduce the high query coat of random sampling and improve the privacy risk resilience of
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baseline network expansion. Second, STARCLOAK introduces a clique-cloak graph to gen-
erate candidate cloaking-star graphs by grouping queries that can be cloaked together based
on their privacy profiles. Finally, STARCLOAK introduces utility-aware and cost effective
pruning strategies to generate final cloaking star graph that has low cost of anonymous
query process and high attack resilience among the set of candidate star-graphs. Intuitively,
STARCLOAK achieves the high attack resilience by employing cloaking star as the basic
unit of location anonymization and by injecting controlled randomness into the cloaking-
star selection process. At the same time, STARCLOAK assures the low query processing
cost by employing the cost-aware star selection scheme to generate the final cloaking star
graph with more compact structure.
4.3 STARCLOAK: Model and Algorithms
In this section, we introduce the design of STARCLOAK in terms of the cloaking star-based
location cloaking model and algorithms. We first describe the concept of cloaking star and
related concepts. Then we introduce a set of core data structures deployed for implementing
the STARCLOAK algorithms before we detail the cloaking graph update, the candidate
cloaking star selection and composition, and the cloaking star pruning algorithms.
4.3.1 Star Structure and Star Graph
In the real world, mobile travelers move on either a spatially constrained road network or
a walking paths. Thus, we model spatially constrained networks using the graph model
of a road network (recall Section 4.2.1). Unlike the conventional location anonymization
solutions, STARCLOAK captures both k-user anonymity and l-segment indistinguishability.
In addition, unlike the conventional solutions, which are based on the random way-point
mobility model and use a rectangular region as a unit of location cloaking, STARCLOAK
introduces a star as the basic unit of location cloaking and refers to each road junction as a
star of the road network graph, G =< VG, EG >. Each star is defined by a vertex with its
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Figure 4.6: Illustration of the STAR model.
Definition 8 (Star) Let G =< VG, EG > denote the road network of interest. We define a
star φi anchored at vertex vi ∈ VG as a subgraph of G, denoted by φi =< V iφ, Eiφ >, and
V iφ = {vi} and Eiφ = {w|w 6= vi, w ∈ VG, (vi, w) ∈ EG}.
According to this definition, every node vi with dG(vi) ≥ 3 is associated with a unique
star φi, which consists of vertex vi and all of its adjacent road segments, that is, those
segments with vi as one of two end nodes. For example, in the left plot of Figure 4.6, star
φ5 comprises node v5 and segments {v5v4, v5v6, v5v10}.
Introducing the star structure as the basic unit of anonymization has a number of ad-
vantages: (1) It preserves the locality of neighboring segments of a vertex and is expected
to lead to the compact structure of the anonymous location; (2) it provides high attack re-
silience against deterministic segment selection process in order to provide high locality;
(3) it allows a compact star indexing structure since each star can be uniquely identified by
its anchor node identifier, which corresponds to both the node itself and all of its neigh-
boring segments (its adjacency list) in G; (4) its compact representation of the anonymized
locations also simplifies the implementation of the STARCLOAK algorithms and reduces
the storage as well as communication costs of anonymous queries.
Definition 9 (Star Graph) Let G = (VG, EG) denote a road network, and each node vi ∈
VG (1 ≤ i ≤ |VG|) corresponds to a star φi with vi as its anchor node. The star network
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of G, denoted by Gφ = (VGφ , EGφ), can be constructed as follows: (1) each node of Gφ is
a star in G, denoted by φi, with node vi ∈ VG as its anchor node; (2) two nodes of Gφ are
adjacent if their corresponding stars in G share a segment, i.e., ∀φi, φj ∈ VGφ , if (φi, φj)
∈ EGφ), then (vi, vj) ∈ EG. All edges in the star graph Gφ are of unit length. Thus, the
distance between two stars φi and φj in a road networkG is measured by their network hop
distance in Gφ, denoted by hG(φi, φj), which is the hop count of the shortest path between
φi and φj .
Figure 4.6 shows an example road network (left) and its corresponding star network (right).
hG(φ6, φ10) = 2, as their shortest path in Gφ is composed of φ6, φ5 and φ10.
4.3.2 Data Structures
To facilitate the presentation of the star-based location anonymization model, in this sec-
tion, we describe important data structures used in the STARCLOAK.
Query Queue, Q: It is a first in first out (FIFO) basic queue structure, and records the
incoming location queries that require to go through the location-anonymization process
before relaying them to the respective LBS providers. The incoming location queries are
inserted into the queue from the tail and the anonymization engine pops new query from
Q to find its cloaked subgraph as its anonymized location S. Upon receiving a location
query q, issued by user u, the location anonymization engine will transform the query focal
location Lq, the exact position of u, to an anonymized location, a subgraph that includes
the road segment on which Lq resides. Anonymization computation is based on the both
privacy (k, l) and utility (st, tt) constraints associated to the query q and its user u and
other queries currently residing in the query queue Q. The temporal resolution tolerance
constraint can be viewed as the temporal expiration deadline of the query.
Expiration Heap, H: It is a max-min heap that maintains the queries in the order
of their expiration time defined by their temporal resolution constraint, tt. Anonymization
engine checksH to identify queries that are close to their expiration deadlines and prioritize
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the queries for anonymization processing or to identify queries that have been expired and
remove them from the query queue Q.
Cloaking Graph, GC : It is a undirected graph dynamically constructed in-memory. It
records the set of queries associated to a star based on their similarities w.r.t. their privacy
requirements, their spatial proximity and their expiration deadlines. The structure and the
usage of the Cloaking Graph will be explained in Section 4.3.6.
Star-Map, MS and Query-Map, MQ: We create a hash map to index stars, called Star-
Node Map, and similarly, another hash map data structure to index queries associated to a
node in the Cloaking Graph, called Query-Node Map.
Candidate Star Set Queue, QC: It is a FIFO-based queue structure that records gener-
ated candidate cloaking-star sets. Pruning engine pops first arrived set form QC and apply
utility-aware and cost-effective pruning algorithm to generate final cloaking-star graph.
4.3.3 Location Query Preprocessing
In STARCLOAK, we first parse an incoming location query qi to generate the internal rep-
resentation of the location query by performing a sequence of tasks as follows:
i) Assign a unique identifier to the query, using secure hash function with user id and
query issue time (i.e., h( qi.uid || qi.t)). Assumed that any user can send only one
query in each time-stamp.
ii) Determine the road segment of a query focal location defined with latitude and longi-
tude values using spatial index.
iii) Insert query to anonymization queue Q.
iv) Insert query to the expiration heap (H) with the query deadline as the key and the
query identifier as the value. Query expiration time is the sum of query issued time t
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query k l ss
q1 4 8 2
q2 3 12 3
q3 5 11 2
q4 4 10 1
q5 3 6 3
q6 2 4 1
q7 5 9 4
























































Figure 4.7: StarCloak Example
and user-defined temporal tolerance tt associated with the query:
te = qi.t+ qi.tt
4.3.4 StarCloak in a Nutshell
Before getting into details of each steps, first, we summarized the STARCLOAK approach.
Algorithm 2 sketches the main procedure of the location anonymization in the STAR-
CLOAK. Location-anonymization engine continuously pops queries from the query queue,
Q, and process them to find anonymized location S, which satisfies privacy and utility re-
quirements. Before starting to process a new query q, STARCLOAK removes all expired
queries from the system (line 4-12). When an expired query, qe, removed from a cloaking
graph node, because of the different privacy and utility requirements it is possible to find
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ALGORITHM 2: StarCloak Algorithm
Input: Q: query queue, H: expiration heap, GC : cloaking graph
Output: QC : candidate star-set queue
1 while true do
2 if Q 6= ∅ then
3 Lu ← ∅;
4 while true do
5 qe ← first entry of H;
6 if qe is expired then
7 nu ← removeQueryfromCloakingGraph(qe);
8 if nu 6= ∅ then
9 Add nu to the Lu;
10 Pop qe from H;
11 else
12 break;
13 foreach nu ∈ Lu do
14 C ← SearchStarSet(nu);
15 if C 6= ∅ then
16 Add C to the QC for pruning;
17 qi ← first entry of Q;
18 φi ← SelectStar(qi);
19 nu ← addQuerytoCloakingGraph(qi, φi);
20 C ← SearchStarSet(nu);
21 if C 6= ∅ then
22 Add C to the QC for pruning;
cloaked subgraph for the remain queries in the node. All updated nodes stored in the list Lu
after the expired queries removed and STARCLOAK attempts to find anonymized location
for those nodes before processing new query (line 13-16). Next, it pops new query from the
queueQ and selects star to assign it (line 18). Thereafter, StarCloak updates cloaking graph
with the new query qi and search possible cloaked location for the updated cloaking graph
node (line 19-22). Finally, in the pruning phase it randomly selects and removes non-active
stars from candidate star sets. Details of the each phase presented in the following sections.
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4.3.5 Select Star
STARCLOAK anonymization engine performs location anonymization by scanning through
the FIFO query queueQ. All segments that are associated with active queries are marked as
active. The anonymization engine first selects a star to assign queries on the active segment
as the initial cloaking star. Each segment has two end nodes and if both end nodes hold
dG(vs) ≥ 3 and dG(vt) ≥ 3, the segment-to-star mapping module needs to determine to
which star this active segment s should be assigned, φs or φt. For example, in Figure 4.6
when the query q1 arrived and segment v5v6 become active one of the two possible stars, φ5
and φ6, is to be determined as an initial cloaking star. Given a road network, one needs to
choose a set of stars {Φ} to cover all the active segments. If a star φ is selected for a given
active segment s, it is said that φ is “selected”, and s is “assigned” to φ, denoted by s← φ.
To save the computation cost of query evaluation at the service provider and the com-
munication bandwidth between the service provider and anonymization server, in STAR-
CLOAK we use a cost model based scheme for mapping active segments to stars. Formally,
let Cost(φ) be the cost of executing a typical query with the anonymous location φ, AS
denote the set of current active segments in the road networkG, and Φ be the set of selected






s.t.∀s ∈ AS,∃φ ∈ Φ, s← φ
This cost-aware segment-to-star assignment scheme aims at finding a set of stars Φ
that cover all the active segments under anonymization consideration, and yet have the
lowest overall cost of anonymous query processing.However, no efficient solution to this
optimization problem exists, unless P = NP, as shown in the following theorem:
Theorem 2 The optimization problem in Expression 4.4 is NP-Hard.
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Proof 1 By removing all the non-active segments in the network G, this problem is de-
ducted to the weighted VERTEX-COVER problem, which is known to be NP-Complete.
Specificially, if ∀φ ∈ G, Cost(φ)=1, i.e., all the stars are associated with identical cost,
then the problem is equivalent to the classical VERTEX-COVER problem, which is also
NP-Complete. Therefor the optimization problem in 2 is NP-Hard.
Instead of attempting to find a global optimal solution, we propose an efficient ran-
domized algorithm that can find high-quality approximate solution, and is robust against
inference attacks. The main idea of our randomized algorithm is to select one of the two
stars based on the probability in reverse proportion to their corresponding query processing
costs. We illustrate this randomized algorithm below through query insertion operation.
The procedure of inserting a new arrival query q associated with segment s (Insert-
Query) consists of the following four cases: (1) if certain star already covers s, the algo-
rithm halts; (2) if both starsφs andφt are already selected, yet s is not covered, one assigns
s to one of the two stars with probability in reverse proportion to their corresponding costs;
(3) if only one star φs or φt has been selected, s is assigned to that star; (4) if neither φvss
nor φvst is selected, one assigns s to the one with probability reversely proportional to the
corresponding cost. Algorithm 3 shows the pseudo code of this procedure.
Essentially, this approach ensures that each active segment s is assigned to φvs0 with
probability Cost(φvs1)/[Cost(φvs0) + Cost(φvs1)], or φvs1 otherwise. This property
guarantees that the quality of the star set Φ selected by our randomized algorithm does not
deviate far from the optimal one. We formally describe this property in Theorem 3 below:
Theorem 3 LetCostopt be the cost achieved by the optimal star set. The randomized star-




≤ 2 · Costopt.
The deletion of expired location queries can be easily incorporated in three steps: find
the active segment containing the expired query, and de-register the query; (ii) if the seg-
ment is associated with no other active queries, the segment is claimed as non-active; and
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ALGORITHM 3: InsertQuery Algorithm
Input: q: new query, Iφ: active star index
Output: φ: selected star
1 s← the segment containing q;
// φt and φs are two stars that share segment s
2 if s is already assigned to φt (or φs) then
3 return φt (or φs);
4 else if {φs, φt} ∩ Iφ = {φnss, φnst} then
// both two stars are active but neighter cover s




6 else if {φnss, φnst} ∩ Iφ = φnss (or φnst ) then
// only one star is active
7 assign s to φnss (or φnst );
8 else if {φnss, φnst} ∩ Iφ = ∅ then
// neither star is selected yet
9 if dG(nss) = 1 or dG(n
s
t) = 1 then
// only one end corresponds to a star
10 add φnst (or φnss) to Iφ;
11 assign s to φnst (or φnss);
12 else
// both ends are intersection nodes




14 add φnss (or φnst ) to Iφ;
15 return φt (or φs);
(iii) if the star covering the segment contains no other active segment, then this star is
removed from the active star index Iφ.
It is worth emphasizing that the quality of the selected stars does not degrade with
continuous insertion/deletion of queries. This is because the algorithm makes no assump-
tion about the order of the arrival of the queries, which is a desirable feature in supporting
real-time road network based LBS.
4.3.6 Cloaking Graph Update
We use cloaking graph to group nearby queries and efficiently index other query groups
that can be cloaked together for easy access. We define cloaking graph as follows;
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Definition 10 (Cloaking Graph) Let GC(VC, EC) be an undirected graph where VC is
the set of nodes, each representing a set of requests, grouped by the star that they assigned
and their location privacy and utility requirement similarities. EC is the set of edges and
there is an edge e = (ni, nj) ∈ EC between two nodes ni and nj iff queries associated
with both vertices can be cloak together based on their l-segment indistinguishability and
spatial tolerance requirements.
In each node ni ∈ VC stores following information:
1. Corresponding star ni.φ. For each active star, there is at least one node in VC .
2. Query set ni.Q, which stores similar queries assigned to star ni.φ.
3. Combined privacy and utility requirements of the queries in ni.Q, which we defined
as follow:







4. Covered star set ni.Θ, a set contains star identifiers, which are within ssni hop
distance from star ni.φ.
5. Segment count ni.sc, number of segments associated with stars in star set ni.Θ.
6. Adjacency list ni.N . Being neighbor indicates that requests in the corresponded
nodes can be cloak together. Two cloaking nodes, ni and nj , have been considered
as a neighbor of each others iff:
(a) Stars associated with each node are an element of the star set of other node;
ni.φ ∈ nj.Θ and ni.φ ∈ nj.Θ
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ALGORITHM 4: Add Query to the Cloaking Graph
Input: qn: new query, φn: assigned star
Output: nu: updated cloaking graph node
1 nu ← ∅;
2 N ←MS.get(φn);
3 ifN 6= ∅ then
4 forall the ni ∈ N do
5 if ssqn < ssni then
6 sc← #segment within sqn from φn;
7 if sc ≥ max(lqn, lni) then
8 add qn to the node ni;
9 nu ← ni;
10 break;
11 else if ni.sc ≥ lqn then
12 add qn to the node ni;
13 nu ← ni;
14 break;
15 if nu = ∅ then
16 nu ← create new node for query qn;
17 return nu;
(b) The number of segments that covered with both nodes is enough to satisfy their
l-segment indistinguishability requirements. Let seg(I) is the corresponding
segment set of star set I = ni.Θ ∩ nj.Θ;
|seg(I)|≥ max{lni, lnj}
In STARCLOAK, we consider personalized privacy and utility model, which allows
users to define their requirements for each query they issued. Consequently, even though
two queries associated with same star it is possible to not being able to cloak those queries
together, because of the conflict between their l-segment indistinguishability and st spatial
tolerance requirements. Therefore, each active star associates with one or more node in
cloaking graph. We used mapMSN to easy access the list of nodes associated with certain
star.
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Cloaking-graph update requires in two situations: insert new query and remove ex-
pired query. Former case outlined in Algorithm 4. When function called to insert a
new query, it checks all cloaking-graph nodes associated with corresponding star, to add
new query. If there is not possible node to add, it creates new node. Concretely, first,
N = MSN .get(φn) used to obtain list of nodes associated with star φn (line 2). N im-
plemented as a queue to increase the chance of generating cloak region for earliest queries
added to the graph. New query can be added to an existing node if their privacy profile
does not conflict with each other. Conflict occurs when new spatial tolerance is not able
to satisfy new l-segment indistinguishability requirement. In other words, there are fewer
number of segments than required within new spatial tolerance distance from the star. Each
node ni ∈ N evaluated to add new query (lines 4 to 14). If new query has less spatial
tolerance requirement than the node, it first calculates the number of segment within the
spatial tolerance of query from star φn. If the number of segment is enough to satisfy seg-
ment indistinguishability requirement, new query added to the node. Similarly, new query
added to a node, if it does not change the spatial tolerance of the node and there is enough
number of segments within spatial tolerance coverage to satisfy segment indistinguishabil-
ity requirement of the new query (lines 9-10). In case a new query cannot be added to the
one of current nodes, STARCLOAK creates a new node for the new query (lines 15-16). It
is important to mention that mobile users define their privacy and utility requirements intu-
itively and it is possible for them to set conflicted segment indistinguishability and spatial
tolerance for their queries. This step detects such conflict in early stage and drops request
immediately without waiting in the system until its expiration time.
To be more clear, we used a scenario given in Figure 4.7. In this example, Figure
4.7.a, shows incoming queries and their privacy requirements (k, l, and ss), ordered
based on their issue time. For the sake of simplicity, we did not include temporal tolerance
values and assumed that queries evaluated before they expired. Query locations on the road
network and selected stars represented in Figure 4.7.b and Figure 4.7.c, respectively. In
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Figure 4.8, we showed updated cloaking graph after each query added. For the first query
q1, assigned to the star φ6, algorithm generates new node v6 with the star set v6.Θ =
{φ6, φ2, φ5, φ7, φ4, φ8, φ10, φ12}, stars within spatial tolerance (ssv6 = 2). When
second query received, new node v10 created and connected with v6, since intersection set
of their star sets includes stars associated with two vertices. However, with the insertion of
query q3, even though the intersection set contains φ5 and φ12 there is no edge between
node v6 and newly created node v12. Because, the number of segments (9) belongs to
stars in the intersection set is not enough to meet segment requirement of the node v6
(11). Query q4 immediately dropped from the system since it is not possible to satisfy
user defined segment requirement with the given spatial tolerance value. When the next
query, q5, received, generated node v5 connected with the nodes v6 and v10, but there is
no edge between v5 and v12, since hG(φ5, φ12) = 3, higher than the spatial tolerance of
the node (ssv12 = 2). Query q6 assigned to the star φn10 , which is already associated
with the node v10 in the graph. Algorithm checks if it is possible to add new query to
the existing node. However, new spatial tolerance and segment diversity requirements
cause conflict. In this case, another node v′10 associated with the same star generated for
the new query and connected with possible nodes (v5). For query q7 created node v13
connected with nodes v10 and v12. At this point there is no possible node set that satisfies
all queries privacy requirements. Query q8 can be include to an existing node v6 without
violating their requirements. Inclusion process requires to update node privacy profile with
the maximum k and l, and minimum ss values. In our example, new privacy and utility
profile is k, l, ss = 4,8,2. Spatial tolerance and segment indistinguishability values are not
changed after the insertion, so it is not necessary to check update on edges connected with
the node.
The procedure of cloaking-graph update, called after the expired query removal, sum-
marized in Algorithm 5. If a cloaking-graph node, associated with expired query, contains






























Figure 4.8: Cloaking Graph Update Example
7). It starts with updating privacy and utility profile of the node. Neighbor list can only
change if segment indistinguishability requirement decrease or spatial tolerance increase.
If the later case occur, the number of star and segment within spatial tolerance coverage
increase.
ALGORITHM 5: Remove Query from Cloaking Graph
Input: qe: expired query
Output: nu: updated cloaking graph node
1 nu ←MQN .get(qe);
2 if |nu.Q|> 1 then
3 update knu , lnu , and stnu ;
4 if lnu < lqe or stnu > stqe then
5 if ssnu > stqe then
6 update nu.Θ and nu.sc;
7 update nu.N ;
8 else
9 remove nu formGC ;
10 nu ← null;
11 updateMS ;
12 remove qe fromMQ;
13 return nu;
Update procedure return a graph node that would be the input for the next step, candi-
date star-set selection. To eliminate unnecessary search, we checked if a node can generate
cloaked region after expired query removed from the node. It is clear that, it is not possible
to generate cloaked subgraph if the removing query does not decrease any of the privacy
requirements or increase the number of neighbor node if the spatial tolerance increase.
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4.3.7 Candidate Star-Set Selection
The goal of this step is to discover set of stars, called candidate star-set, which con-
stitutes a possible anonymized sub-graph for certain queries. In order to find such star
set, STARCLOAK searches over cloaking-graph and identifies set of nodes, NS, that sat-
isfy privacy requirements of all queries associated with each node. Formally, let func-
tion seg(Star Set) returns all segments associated with input stars, NS meets k-user
anonymity and l-segment indistinguishability requirements if and only if it satisfy follow-
ing:
∀ni ∈ NS, kni ≤
∑
nj∈NS|nj.Q| and lni ≤ |seg(
⋂
nj∈NS nj.Θ)|.





Before we explain the detail of candidate star-set selection algorithm, we elucidate con-
tributory method, which checks node set if it satisfy privacy requirements, in Algorithm 6.
First, it initialize the maximum k-user anonymity (maxk), maximum l-segment indistin-
guishability (maxl), total query count (kc), and covered star set from all nodes (Sstar)
with the first node of the set (lines 1 to 3). Afterwards, for each other node in the set, it
updatesmaxk,maxl, kc, and Sseg as follows: maxk andmaxl with the k and l values
of the node, respectively, if they are higher than their maximum value; kc with the sum of
the kc and the number of query in the node; and Sstar with the union of the current star set
and stars covered by new node (lines 4 to 8). If number of query is not enough to satisfy
maximum k-user anonymity, it returns empty set. Otherwise, algorithm finds number of
segments within the star set and checks if it is higher than the maximum l-segment indis-
tinguishability requirement. If there is enough segments, algorithm return star set Sstar,
otherwise, returns empty set.
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ALGORITHM 6: Requirement Check
Input: NS: node set
Output: Sstar: star set
1 maxk ← kn0, maxl ← ln0 ;
2 kc ← |n0.Q|;
3 Sstar ← n0.Θ;
4 forall the ni ∈ NS − n0 do
5 maxk ← max(maxk, kni);
6 maxs ← max(maxs, lni);
7 kc ← kc + |ni.Q|;
8 Sstar ← Sstar ∩ ni.Θ;
9 if kc < maxk then
10 return ∅;
11 Sseg ← ∅;
12 forall the φi ∈ Sstar do
13 Sseg ← Sseg ∪ φi;
14 if |Sseg|< maxl then
15 return ∅;
16 return Sstar;
In Algorithm 7 we outlined candidate star-set selection step. Searching NS over
cloaking-graph starts with the updated node in the previous step, cloaking-graph update.
If the number of assigned query to the starting node is fewer than the k-user anonymity
requirement of the node 1, algorithm continues searching process over the neighbor nodes,
which is ordered by the hop distance between their associated star and the starting node’s
star. For each neighbor node, it applies requirement check for the two nodes, updated and
neighbor nodes, together (line 6-8). If candidate star set cannot be found, neighbor node
evaluated with the all possible node combinations generated with the previously processed
neighbor nodes. Possible node combination is the set of nodes that satisfy segment diver-
sity requirement yet not contains enough query to meet k-anonymity requirement. After
each neighbor node’s evaluation process, if there is no candidate star set available, we up-
date list of node combinations for the next neighbor node evaluation. Let QiComb is the
all possible node combinations for the neighbor nodes n0, n1, ..., ni, all possible node
1Each node in cloaking graph satisfies its segment l-segment indistinguishability requirement
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ALGORITHM 7: Search Star Set
Input: nu: updated node
1 NS ← nu;
2 if (SS ← RequirementCheck(NS)) 6= ∅ then
3 return SS;
4 else
5 forall the nn ∈ nu.N do
6 NS ← nu ∪ nn;
7 if (SS ← RequirementCheck(NS)) 6= ∅ then
8 return SS;
9 else
10 QTemp ← QComb;
11 forall the C ∈ QComb do
12 if ∀nc ∈ C,nc ∈ nn.N then
13 NS ← nu ∪ nn ∪ C;
14 if (SS ← RequirementCheck(NS)) 6= ∅ then
15 return SS;
16 else
17 Cnew ← C ∪ nn;
18 QTemp ← QTemp ∪ Cnew;
19 QComb ← QTemp
combinations for the neighbor ni+1, Q
i+1
Comb, is the set which includes Q
i
Comb and new
combinations that can be generate with ni and each combination C ∈ QiComb (i.e., form
a clique together and satisfy segment diversity requirement).
Suppose that we are searching candidate star set for the cloaking graph node v6 updated
due to the query q8 insertion in the previous step. It first checks if the v6 satisfies privacy
requirement, since there is not enough query it stars evaluating neighbor vertices starting
from the closest one v5. Two nodes cannot meet user privacy nodes. Before evaluating next
neighbor node v10 we update possible combination set which is currently empty. Node v5
is the only neighbor node combination available and added to the set. In the next step it
first evaluates vertices v6 and v10 together and then combination {v5}. Note that node set
{v5, v6, v10} satisfies all queries privacy requirement. Selected vertices removed from the
cloaking graph and the candidate star set (φn2, φn4, φn5, φn6, φn7, φn10) generated.
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4.3.8 Star-Set Pruning
Final step is the randomly pruning extra segments from candidate star set. This step plays
an important role in the generation of the low cost cloaked subgraphs and the attack re-
silience by selecting stars randomly from outer to center of the candidate star-set. It also
provides attack resilience by selecting star randomly. Note that this step is independent
from the earlier stages of the STARCLOAK, so anonymization engine can process other
queries while one prunes other candidate star set. It is also possible to run pruning algo-
rithms in parallel.
Algorithm 8 sketches the pruning procedure. For each candidate star sets one first
identifies boundary stars, which are the stars that has at least one neighbor star not in the
candidate star set. It also identifies active stars that can not be remove from the set. In each
iteration STARCLOAK selects randomly one star φr from boundary star set and removes
it from final star set, SS. Then it if SS still satisfies l-diversity requirement, updates
boundary node and moves to the next iteration. Otherwise, it adds back φr to the SS and
finalize anonymization step.
To make it more clear we use an example given in Figure 4.9, where candidate star
set shown in the left side of the Figure 4.9 with the black and gray circles. Black circles
depicts blocked nodes that cannot be removed, because of the association with the selected
queries. Suppose that maximum segment requirement is 9. First, one generates bound-
ary star list {φn5, φn7, φn9, φn13}, gray circles that are connected with the white circles.
Once this is done, one of the boundary star selected randomly, lets say φn5 in our exam-
ple. After removing φn5 , remaining stars still meets the segment requirement. Boundary
star set updated with the new star φn10 and another star selected randomly from the set.
Suppose that star φn7 selected for pruning. Segment diversity requirement satisfied with
the remaining stars. Note that there is no new boundary star, because φn12 is an active
star. One selects another star from the boundary star set, {φn5, φn9, φn10, φn13}. Assume
that φn9 selected to remove. Boundary star set updated with new star φn15 . In the next
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ALGORITHM 8: Prune Candidate Star Set
Input: Qc: canidate star set queue
1 while true do
2 ifQC 6= ∅ then
3 SS ← pop the first entry ofQC ;
4 BS ← find boundary stars of SS;
5 FS ← select active stars;
6 σmaxs ← find max segment requirement;
7 while true do
8 φr ← randomly select star fromBS;
9 if φr /∈ FS then
10 SS ← SS \ φr;
11 if # of segment in SS > σmaxs then
12 updateBS;
13 else



























Figure 4.9: Pruning Example
iteration φn13 selected and new boundary star set would be φn5, φn10, φn15 . However,
removing any of those star violates queries segment diversity requirement, thus we added
back selected star to the star list. Associated segments generates cloaked sub-graph and can
be used as an anonymized location for the selected queries. On the right side of the Figure
4.9, we showed generated cloaked sub-graph with bold lines.
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4.4 Optimizations
In this section, we deal with the issues in implementing STARCLOAK in the location
anonymization engine (LAE), and propose multiple optimizations to improve its perfor-
mance, bringing in considerable enhancement over the basic version.
4.4.1 Spatially Bounded StarCloak
Basic StarCloak algorithm generates cloak regions whenever it finds query set that sat-
isfy all queries’ privacy requirement. However, this approach may cause generating high
cost cloak regions since it is possible to select stars which are far, yet within spatial tol-
erance, from each other. For instance, Figure 4.10 shows an example scenario for queries
(q1, q2, ..., q9) uniformly distributed over road-network (4.10a). Suppose that queries
issued in the order of their id and all has 3 k-anonymity requirement. For the sake of
simplicity we did not include segment diversity requirement in this example and spatial
tolerance value is high enough to cover all stars in our small road network. In Figure 4.10b
we gave an example star assignments for the nine queries. When we apply basic StarCloak
approach for given queries selected stars would be like black circles in Figure 4.10c, 4.10e
and 4.10e. It can be noticed that selected stars spread all over the network. On the other
hand, Figure 4.10f, 4.10g and 4.10h show more compact star selection possibility for the
same queries with different combinations.
We propose Spatial-Bounded StarCloak algorithm to generate more compact cloaked
subgraphs. The essence of this optimization is to sacrificing anonymization time to gener-
ate cloak regions with low query processing and communication costs. We define a system
parameter λ ≥ 1, called compactness factor, that controls the maximum hop distance
between selected vertices in the candidate star set. To this end, we made some modifica-
tions on candidate star-set selection step given at Algorithm 7. First we grouped neighbors




































































































(h) q3, q4, q9
Figure 4.10: Spatially Bounded StarCloak Example
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Figure 4.11: Average traffic in downtown Atlanta. The color codes red, orange, yellow
and green represents relative traffic speeds with stop and go, slow, moderate and free flow,
respectively.
element. At each level one only consider neighbor nodes, which can be cloak with the
node combinations generated in the previous level. If any level cannot generate any node
combination algorithm halts. Spatial-Bounded StarCloak enforce compactness by select-
ing active stars that for each star in the star set there is at least one other star which is not
further then (2.λ - 1) hop distance.
Suppose that for the previous example we used Spatial-Bounded StarCloak with com-
pactness factor λ = 1. During the process of query q3, one first checks neighbor nodes
which is 1 hop distance from the star φ6. Since there is no neighbor in the level 1, pro-
cess halts and anonymization engine accept new query to process. However, while it is
processing q7, it first adds neighbor node associated with the star φ12 which is in the 1
hop distance level. Two nodes does not satisfy k-anonymity requirement, it continue to
process neighbor nodes at the second level (φ9 and φ13). Since we used FIFO based query
processing ordering to decrease waiting time, φ13 would select for next iteration. Three
nodes meets all users privacy requirement and can be remove from cloaking graph.
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4.4.2 Hybrid StarCloak
Optimal compactness factor λ for the Spatially Bounded StarCloak can be determine by
the request density in the area, which is highly dynamic and can change street-by-street or
star-by-star. For instance Figure 4.11 shows average traffic density in downtown Atlanta. It
can be notice that even neighbor segments may have different densities. It is not possible to
define optimal compactness factor for each star at each time. Determined λ value based on
the number of request per second in the predefined area, may cause low success rate for the
queries issued by relatively sparse sub-areas. To overcome this problem we propose hybrid
approach which leverage advantages from both Basic and Spatially Bounded StarCloak
approaches. In this method first we try to generate cloak regions with Spatially Bounded
StarCloak method. After that for those queries, could not cloak for a while and it is close
to expire, we apply basic StarCloak algorithm. We used consideration factor α as the
system level value to decide when we apply basic StarCloak algorithm for requests. One
periodically checks expiration heap if any query is close to expiration time.
When we used Spatially Bounded StarCloak with compactness factor λ = 1 for the
previous example at Figure 4.10, queries q3, q4 and q9 would remain in the system until
new queries issued in the neighborhood, since the distance between two stars σ6 and σ8 is
two hop. However, if any of those query expire at this time, it would be drop even though
there is a possible cloaked subgraph. With Hybrid StarCloak we able to cloak those vertices
together.
4.5 Experimental Evaluations
We performed extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of StarCloak approach
on real road-network datasets. We used evaluation metrics described in Section 4.5.2.
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4.5.1 Experimental Setup
We used two different real road network datasets, California2 and Georgia3, with varying
sizes to observe the effect of query density on the efficiency and effectiveness of StarCloak
approach. California road network dataset contains only highways with 21,693 edges and
21,048 nodes. 87,635 points of interest from 62 different classes (e.g. hospital, school etc.)
associated with the road network. Larger road-network dataset, Georgia, contains primary
and secondary roads with 430,849 edges and 428,708 nodes.
To simulate user movements we used moving object dataset generator developed by
Brinkhoff 4. We assign a same number (10,000) of moving objects to each map. Since
the two maps are of significantly different scales, we intend to simulate both high user
density (rush hour) and low user density (non-rush hour) conditions. In each simulation,
we defined two classes of moving objects, with speeds corresponding to slow (e.g., trucks)
and fast (e.g., passenger cars) vehicles, respectively. With a randomly assigned probability,
each vehicle generates a set of (or none) k-NN queries during the simulation, with the
parameters specified as follows: (1) the requested number of nearest points of interest
as k; (2) the category of the points of interest as c, e.g., church, hospital, etc.; (3) the
privacy requirements as k-anonymity (δk) and l-diversity (δl); and (4) the service quality
requirements as the spatial (σs) and temporal tolerance (σt). The values of each query
are drawn independently following certain distributions, with parameters listed in Table
4.1. Note that all the parameters except c follow normal distributions; c follows a uniform
distribution over the interval [0, 62]; the values of σt, γ, and α are in the unit of second.
After issuing a query, the vehicle waits for some normally distributed inter-wait time γ,
until the request is either answered or dropped, before issuing another service request.
Compactness λ and consideration α factors are used only for the Spatially Bounded and





Table 4.1: Default parameter setting for query generation.
parameters k c δk δl σs σt γ λ α
mean 5 N/A 5 5 4 10 20 1 2
deviation 1 N/A 1.5 1.5 1 2 2 0 0
and tested on a Windows 7 platform with Intel(R) Core(TM) CPU (4.00 GHz) and 16GB
memory.
4.5.2 Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate the performance of the proposed location privacy preserving mechanisms, we
used following metrics: success rate, successful throughput, anonymization time, query
processing time, candidate list size and entropy.
Success Rate: One of the most important measure for evaluating the effectiveness of
the anonymization algorithm. The main objective of cloaking technique is to anonymize
maximum number of service requests. Success rate can be define as the fraction of success-
fully anonymized queries with respect to number of total queries issued by mobile users.
Anonymization Time: Since anonymization process increases the response time, it
affects users experience while they are using location-based services. Average anonymiza-
tion time metric measures the run-time performance of the cloaking algorithms in terms of
average time elapsed in the anonymization engine for each successfully anonymized query.
Note that we use only successfully anonymized queries for a fair comparison to eliminate
the effect of the success rate performance of the algorithm.
Query Processing Time: In order to respond anonymous location-based queries, LBS
provider needs to evaluate over cloaked sub-graph instead of users’ exact location. This
metric measures the processing cost at the LBS server site. Number of border nodes and
edges of generated cloak region effects processing time as described in Section 4.2.4.
Candidate Set Size: Measures the communication cost between the anonymization
engine and the LBS w.r.t size of the candidate result set. More compact sub-graphs lead
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less communication cost.
Successful Throughput: To evaluate scalability of the anonymization algorithms, we
used successful throughput as a metric which considers responsiveness of the model and
the execution time of anonymizing a query [45]. We calculate successful throughput as;
query execution rate × anonymization success rate
Entropy: We used entropy as a quantitative measure of uncertainty achieved by cloak-





where pi denotes the probability of the user identity being associate with segment si ∈
S. Note that, the number of segments in the generated cloaked subgraph may vary for each
anonymization algorithm based on it’s segment selection strategy. Using simple entropy
for different sized cloaked region may mislead to capture actual strength of the algorithm.






Results on Query Processing Time
We now take a close examination of the impact of the location anonymization operation
over the service performance. First we evaluate anonymized query processing cost. Specif-
ically, in terms of the query execution cost, we measure the average execution time of
processing a query at the server side. Note that each algorithm has different success rate
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Figure 4.12: Query execution cost (in terms of the average query processing time per query)
and communication cost (in terms of the average size fo candidate result per query) with
respect to varying settings of parameters δk, δs, σs and k.
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performance and considering all anonymized locations to get average anonymization time
is not fair comparison. For example Hybrid StarCloak generates mostly low cost cloaked
sub-graphs, but sometimes rather than dropping query, it generates very high cost cloaked
sub-graphs. Including these cost does not reflects actual performance of the algorithm. For
this reason we select the same number of anonymized locations, N , generated by each
algorithm. N is the number of cloaked region generated by the algorithm with minimum
success rate.
Figure 4.12 shows that the StarCloak approaches generates lower costs in most cases
with respect to query processing time. As expected among three StarCloak approaches, ba-
sic one generates high cost anonymized locations, since unlike others it select stars without
considering their closeness.
Results on Candidate Result Size
In this set of experiment we evaluate anonymization algorithms over their communica-
tion cost performance. We measure the average number of object return in the candidate
result of a query to reflect communication cost. Similarly we consider same number of
anonymized location for each algorithm. Figure 4.12 illustrates that our StarCloak ap-
proaches generates more compact cloaked subgraphs than the XStar in most cases.
Results on Success Rate
Our experimental results show that StarCloak approaches has high success rates because
of the ability to handling different user requirements and finding possible cloaked regions
immediately. Figure 4.13 and 4.14 plot the percentage of the incoming queries that success-
fully anonymized with varying privacy and service requirements for California and Georgia
maps respectively. Success rate for Hybrid StarCloak is between for the naive StarCloak
and the Spatially Bounded StarCloak. It is expected because it generates cloak regions for
queries in the sparse area where Spatially Bounded StarCloak cannot generate, however
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Figure 4.13: Success rate for California Map
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Figure 4.14: Success rate for Georgia Map
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it is not the same with the basic StarCloak since in the second evaluation those queries
does not have enough neighbor queries that they can cloak together as in the case of SC.
Meanwhile, while the number of δk requirement increases the effect on success rate for the
Hybrid StarCloak decrease. The reason is, since the queries wait in the system longer the
chance of finding neighbor node with Spatially Bounded StarCloak increase.
As shown in the figures, increasing privacy requirement decrease the success rate for
both anonymization approaches as expected, but the effects are different for each maps and
privacy requirements. While δk requirement is increasing, in Georgia map success rate
decreases more than in California map. This can be explained by the density of queries.
For the same number of users in California map it is possible to find queries in the neigh-
borhood, however in the sparse map like Georgia, the chance of finding enough query in
the same spatial tolerance is lower. On the other hand, for the XStar increasing δl require-
ment effects success rate in California map more than the Georgia unlike the StarCloak
approaches. Interestingly, query density is also same reason for this case. The XStar re-
quires to anonymize queries on the same star together. This means that cloaked subgraph
needs to include the number of segment that meets maximum δl requirement among the
queries in the star within the minimum σs spatial tolerance value, which may not be pos-
sible. However, in StarCloak approach if there is a conflict between two queries based
on their segment diversity and spatial tolerance values they group on different cloaking
network vertices.
Third and forth of the Figure 4.13 and 4.14 display the impact of changing service
requirements on success rate. As expected increasing spatial and temporal tolerances in-
crease the chance of the successful anonymization for the queries. Clearly we can see that,
low spatial tolerance values effects XStar more than StarCloak approaches due to the lack
of handling query conflict problem, especially when the area dense like California. It can
be notice that, when the σs = 1 all StarCloak approaches generate cloaked subgraphs
with the same success rate. It is expected because if the compactness metric (λ = 1) is
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Figure 4.15: Anonymization time for California Map
equal the spatial tolerance value all the StarCloak approaches process in the same manner.
Results on Anonymization Time
In this set of experiments we measure the anonymization performance with respect to time
elapsed from the query issued time to successfully anonymized time. Not that we did not
include dropped queries to eliminate the effect of algorithm success rate. The results shows
that StarCloak approaches produce significantly better anonymization time with varying
privacy and service requirements. SC generates cloak regions whenever there is a possible
set of queries that meets all users privacy and service requirements. This leads to lowest
average anonymization time. On the other hand, all other approaches waits other queries to
be in the neighborhood. However, even though we used λ = 1 as a compactness metric
anonymization time for the StarCloak optimizations are better than XStar. Besides the
ability to handling query conflicts, searching process that StarCloak approaches consider is
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Figure 4.16: Anonymization time for Georgia Map
also effects anonymization time. In the XStar during the super-star construction step one
randomly selects additional stars until it satisfies requirements. However, this selection is
strict and there is no star removing option. On the other hand in StarCloak it checks all the
possible star combinations to generate super-set, which leads to less anonymization time.
Hybrid StarCloak performs worst with respect to anonymization time in our StarCloak
approaches yet there is not much difference between Spatially Bounded version. This is
expected, because queries that anonymized with Hybrid StarCloak but not with Spatially
Bounded StarCloak, are close to their expiration time. Which means that they are in the
system for a while and increase the average anonymization time.
Results on Successful Throughput
This set of experiment shows that STARCLOAK approaches produces high and relatively
stable successful throughputs with the various service requirement parameters. As Figure
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Figure 4.17: Successful throughput for California Map
4.17 and 4.20 show that baseline algorithms are not applicable w.r.t their scalability perfor-
mance. Because, they are not carefully design to quickly identify possible cloaked regions
and each time search from the segments in the spatial tolerance.
STARCLOAK approaches perform better than XStar based on the successful through-
put metrics. Searching process in XStar is faster, since it search on only neighbor active
stars. However, the number of unsuccessful attempts is high, which decrease the successful
throughput. On the other hand, with efficient index mechanism STARCLOAK able to cloak
more user in less time.
Attack Resilience
We considered replay attack model described in Section 4.2.5 to evaluate the anonymization
algorithms strength w.r.t. attack resilience. Figure 4.19 and 4.20 show the normalized
entropy results for the various parameters. As expected while Random Expansion model
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Figure 4.18: Successful throughput for Georgia Map
shows high attack resilience, Network Expansion is the weakest anonymization model.
Note that, even though Random Expansion uses completely random selection, it still not
reach the optimal entropy value which is 1 for normalized entropy. The reason is the
using spatial tolerance constraint to generate cloaked regions, since the segments in the
center of the cloak regions tend to be high likelihood values. Experiments shows that
STARCLOAK approaches shows strong attack resilience, where in most cases it is close to
Random Selection model and higher than the XStar model.
As we argued in the Section 4.2.5, first graph shows that, if the same cloak region gen-
erated for more user identifying starting segment getting harder. Note that it is not possible
to capture this whit General Replay Attack model which does not consider other queries in
the cloaked region. However, with Correlation-based Replay Attack model we showed the
effect of the δk value on the attack resilience. Network Expansion is the exception in this
case, since it needs to expand more to satisfy k-anonymity requirement and the chance to
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Figure 4.19: Average entropy for California Map
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Figure 4.20: Average entropy for Georgia Map
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pinpoint starting segment gets higher.
Final set of experiments show that XStar is vulnerable against our newly defined attack
model, Injection-based Attack. Random and Network Expansion models are not based on
the other queries and entropy value for those models remain still. As the number of queries
in the cloak region known by attacker increases XStar perform worse attack resilience than
the STARCLAOK approaches. Note that in this experiments we used the same user move-
ment simulation data. In this case known queries can be spread over the cloak region, which
decrease the attack success. However, smart attacker may inject queries to the system as




In this chapter we address limitations of the current spatial-temporal cloaking techniques
and present a first spatial trigger based system to establish personalized privacy quaran-
tine areas in the physical or cyber space to enable objects and people to maintain spatial
and temporal privacy at selected area of interests at the selected time interval. We intro-
duce a novel concept of PrivacyZone and a suit of algorithms for constructing personalized
privacy-zones and enforcing privacy-zone protection for mobile users or moving objects
on the roads. Our PrivacyZone system has four innovative properties. First, we provide
efficient mechanisms to enable mobile users or owners of moving objects to specify their
desired privacy-zones with both spatial and temporal customization. Second, we develop
a suite of privacy-zone construction algorithms that can effectively install personalized
privacy-zones on road networks or travel paths in both outdoor and indoor environments.
Third, we device an energy efficient privacy-zone enforcement algorithms that provide real-
time spatial and temporal alerts to ensure no location exposure for users who enter their
personalized privacy-zones. Forth, we designed a novel mobile permission system based
on PrivacyZone, which provide mobile users more flexibility to enforce their privacy per-
missions, while minimizing their efforts. Our experimental results demonstrate the utility
of PrivacyZone in real work environment.
5.1 Introduction
Recently, several spatial cloaking algorithms have been proposed in order to protect location-
based service users’ privacy [7, 8, 54, 45]. The main idea of the spatial cloaking is to
replace user exact location with a spatio-temporal region that satisfies certain privacy re-
quirements such as k-anonymity and l-indistinguishability. However, conventional cloak
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region-based location privacy techniques have limited applicability in current mobile envi-
ronment. Most importantly existing location-based applications in the market (e.g., Apple
App store, Google play) are designed to accept focal location as an exact GPS coordinate
instead of a region. Another limitation is that most of the spatial cloaking algorithms are
based on snapshot queries (e.g., where is the closest gas station?) and new random pseudo-
ID used for each location update to eliminate possible linkage attack between two con-
secutive cloaked region. However, most of the popular location-based applications require
continuous location monitoring in order to provide useful services such as step-counter
applications (e.g., Runkeeper).
In addition to applicability limitations the quality of service is the another limitation of
the current spatial cloaking techniques. Generally mobile users concern is to be associate
with certain location. For example, while going to hospital may be a sensitive information
for someone, he may not care sharing his location when he is in the restaurant. However,
generating cloak region for each location update cause unnecessary service utility degra-
dation. Also, spatial cloaking systems require a trusted middle ware servers in order to
provide anonymity which is susceptible to a single-point failure.
In this work, we focus on developing a privacy protection mechanism that can apply
directly on current smart phone applications as part of the mobile permission systems.
Modern smart phone platforms such as Android or iOS provide numerous apps that facil-
itate the user’s daily life like Google Maps 1. Most of the applications relies on to access
several personal information about the user in order to provide services (e.g., GPS, camera).
However, many mobile applications today aggressively collect much more personal con-
text data than what is needed to provide their functionalities. In current mobile platforms
protecting personal information rely on permission system that allow user to control (allow
or deny) third-party apps’ access to certain personal information. Unfortunately, current
mobile permission systems have several limitations. First of all, current permission system
1https://www.google.com/maps
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is based on ”take it or leave it” approach. To avoid the risks, a user can decide not to install
application or not to release any context information to them but then the user might not be
able to enjoy the utility provided by these applications. If a user allows an application, the
user must blindly trust that application will properly handle their private data. [55] shows
that a better trade-off can be achieved by providing users with additional decision types,
where sensitive information is only partially revealed to apps in exchange for some utility.
Another limitation of the current permission system is related to the static nature of
the access decisions. The assumption is the user permission decisions are not frequently
change. However, it is possible for a user to allow apps to access his location while the
user in the park but would like to deny when he is in the hospital. One basic option for this
problem is to ask user for each context request issued from the apps [56]. However, this
approach requires a significant effort from the user since a single app can make tens to hun-
dreds of sensitive requests every day [57, 58]. Hence, to support context-aware permission
policies, advanced mechanisms are needed to help users with the overhead introduced by
runtime permissions.
Recent years several research project propose new permission mechanisms [59]. How-
ever, proposed solutions are follows one-size-fits-all paradigm. We believe that each con-
text needs to handle separately since each of them required specific privacy protection
mechanism. For instance, location permission should be considered separately from the
microphone permissions. Particularly, in this work we focus on efficient location permis-
sion mechanism. Most of the mobile application request access to users location data,
because to advertisers, location is one of the most valuable information. However, location
access has introduced a new class of privacy threats. These threats range from an adver-
sary’s ability to localize an individual to profiling and identifying him based on the places
he visits. For example, personal medical condition by knowing users frequent visits to
specific clinics.
To overcome these limitations we propose new location privacy protection system called
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PrivacyZone. The main idea is to block location disclose only in the personalized privacy
quarantine areas, otherwise share obfuscated position such as randomly selected location
in the privacy zone in order to continue application usability. In this system user first define
his personal private zones and required privacy level. Private zones can be selected either
by choosing a location on the map or providing semantic location (e.g., health care) to se-
lect all related locations in the area. Privacy level can be define as a spatial or time distance
to reach a selected location with considering road network constraint.This system provides
users more flexibility to enforce their privacy permissions, while minimizing their efforts.
Generating privacy zones and hiding location when user in the quarantine areas is only
part of the story. Supporting privacy zones as a service introduce several technical chal-
lenges. Negligent management of privacy zone processing can lead to excessive energy
consumption of mobile devices, especially when the location-based application relies on
continuous tracking of mobile devices. We argue in this work that intelligent technique can
be developed for scalable processing of privacy zones by minimizing the amount of contin-
uous monitoring of mobile objects locations. Furthermore, the performance of privacy zone
processing can be affected by a number of factors, such as frequency of wake-ups - how
often mobile devices should wake up because of possible privacy zone hits and frequency
of privacy zone checks - how many privacy zones should be evaluated at each wake-ups.
Since frequent and possible unnecessary wake-ups and privacy zone checks not only reduce
battery life of mobile devices considerably but also increase the loads of as privacy zone
processing server, we need efficient privacy zone processing that can reduce the number
of unnecessary wake-ups and privacy zone checks at each wake-ups. Finally, the privacy
zone processing system should scale to a large number of privacy zones and mobile objects,
while meeting the low latency goal.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We provide efficient mechanisms to enable mobile users or owners of moving objects
to specify their desired privacy-zones with both spatial and temporal customization.
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• We develop a suite of privacy-zone construction algorithms that can effectively install
personalized privacy-zones on road networks or travel paths in both outdoor and
indoor environments.
• We device an energy efficient privacy-zone monitoring algorithms that provide real-
time spatial and temporal checks to ensure no location exposure for users who enter
their personalized privacy-zones.
• We designed a novel mobile permission system based on PrivacyZone, which provide
mobile users more flexibility to enforce their privacy permissions, while minimizing
their efforts.
Our experimental results demonstrate the utility of PrivacyZone in real work environ-
ment.
5.2 System Overview
PrivacyZone enables users to consider context information and make fine-grained location
privacy decisions. This provide better trade-off between privacy and utility. In this section,
we describe the concept and the architecture of the PrivacyZone as a new privacy protection
mechanism, road network model, and user defined privacy zone model.
5.2.1 Concept
In this work we focus on the applications that requires access to users’ location information
in order to provide their services. For example, Groupon 2 shows user about deals in their
vicinity, or Yelp 3 gives user information about nearby business. Such applications can run
in the foreground or background. Even though this application provide useful information,




Figure 5.1: Demo: Create Privacy Zone
In PrivacyZone, mobile users can define the privacy preferences with spatial and tem-
poral customization. When entering his/her privacy zone, the mobile users exact location
service requests will be on-hold and will only be released until the mobile user moves out-
side of his/her privacy zone. The spatial and temporal delay imposed by the privacy zone
is customizable based on mobile users specific interests. When application running on the
background, to prevent application crashes instead of holding the location request, we pro-
vide random location in the current privacy zone. This approach is especially useful for
the applications that providing exact location is not critical such as weather applications.
However, if the application running on the foreground, decision about providing exact or
fake location will be made by the user only if he/she is in the privacy zone. This approach
provide user high flexible privacy and utility control over the application with minimal
permission management effort.
Figure 5.1 shows a screen of Privacy Zone system that user define their privacy zones.
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Figure 5.2: User alert example
Figure 5.3: System architecture
Figure 5.2 shows an example dialog that PrivacyZone alerts user if the application wants to
access user location while the user is in one of his privacy zones. This dialog shows only if
the application running in foreground, otherwise it will apply predefined rule either block
or obfuscate.
5.2.2 Architecture
In the design of the PrivacyZone system we consider the following goals: Efficiency in
the resource-constrained mobile devices; Privacy guarantee with not allowing adversaries
to access raw location data while user in the privacy zone; Scalability in the PrivacyZone
server to handle large number of user; Flexibility, to enable users to configure their privacy
preferences for each application.
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In our model untrusted applications access user location data through PrivacyZone
client and do not have access to raw sensor data. PrivacyZone Processing System with
the available road network information is responsible to generate privacy zones with re-
spect to users’ privacy preferences. PrivacyZone client and server collaborate to decide
whether to allow exact location, suppress the request, or send fake location in the privacy
zone. In order to provide efficient system it is important to orchestrate PrivacyZone server
and client carefully. In addition, it is reported that data communication via SSL is still vul-
nerable to the Man-in-the-Middle attack and no convincing solution is ready yet. In order
to provide privacy guarantee it is important to design orchestration that not require exact
location to send to the PrivacyZone server when the user is in the privacy zone. In Section
5.3 we present several approaches, that each focus on different design decisions.
5.2.3 Road Network Model
We model the road network as a directed graph G = (V,E). The node set V =
{n0, n1, ..., n|V |} represents road junctions and the edge set E = {ninj|ni, nj ∈ V }
represents road segments. We refer to an edge ninj as a segments that connects two road
junction node ni and nj . The listing order of the two end nodes of the edge ninj repre-
sents the direction of the road segments. In other words, while the edge ninj represents
one direction starting from ni to nj , njni represents the opposite direction. For each edge
we maintain road segment related information such as segment length (e.g., 0.8 miles) and
speed limit (e.g., 55 miles/hr). We used length(ninj) and speed limit(ninj) to represent
length and speed limit of the road segment ninj , respectively. Speed limit is used to iden-




We denote a road network location by L = (ninj, p) which includes two elements;
road segment, ninj and the progress p along the segment (i.e., distance from ni). Note




















Figure 5.4: Star and Rectangular Shape Privacy Zones
by the segment that starts from the node and the zero progress (i.e., L(ninj, 0)). The
road network distance between two locations L1 = (ninj, p1) and L2 = (nknl, p2)
is the total distance of the shortest path between the two positions L1 and L2. We used
two type of road network distance; length-based and travel time-based. Formally we define
length-based road network distance as follows:




in which SP (nj, nk) denote the set of segments that forms a path from nj to nk with the














Privacy zone is a sensitive location defined by user. In our work we consider underlying
road network and define privacy zone as a star-shaped subgraph centered at the focal lo-
cation denoted as PZ(Lf , r) in which Lf is the road network location of the focal point
and r is the size of the privacy zone, represented by a range from the focal location. Range
can be define with both travel time-base (e.g., 5 minutes distance to Lenox Mall) or length-
based (e.g., 2 miles distance to Klaus Building). Figure 5.4 shows three star shaped privacy
zone examples with focal locations L1, L2, and L3. The set of segments inside the privacy
zone PZ denoted as SPZ . We called those points on the road-network which bound a pri-
vacy zone border points. For example, b24 is one of the seven border points of the privacy
zone with the focal location L2.
In addition to star-shaped privacy zones, it is also possible to define rectangle shape
privacy zones as shown in the Figure 5.4. In this case user define the privacy zone as
PZ(Lf , rx, ry) in which rx and ry are the spatial dimension of the PrivacyZone. How-
ever, this approach may require to block some location, even if the user is not close to
focal location with respect to underlying road network. In Section 4.5 we evaluated the
performance of these two privacy zone shapes through simulated experiments.
User may also define privacy zones as batch by selecting the semantic of the focal
locations. One considers all locations with the specified type as a focal object and generates
respected privacy zone for each focal object. For example, Figure 5.5 shows privacy zones
for all religious buildings as a focal object with 2 minutes travel distance.
5.2.5 Privacy Model
The goal of the PrivacyZone is to assure to hide mobile travelers exact location while the
user in one of his privacy zones. Intuitively, from the adversary perspective, the difficulty
of tracking a user is in proportion to the number of segments that she is possibly associated
with. We use segment indistinguishably as a resilience measure of the privacy protection
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Figure 5.5: Privacy Zones for all religious buildings
mechanism against location spoofing attacks.
Definition 11 Privacy zone PZ for a user u is l-segment indistinguishable, if PZ con-
tains at least l road segments such that the association of any of the l segments with user u
is indistinguishable from the other l− 1 segments.
Given a privacy zone PZ with a set of segments SPZ , the ideal protection is achieved
if each segment is indistinguishable to the adversary: the mobile object is associated with
each segment inSPZ with equal probability 1/|SPZ|. However, with effective attacks (see
Section 5.2.6), the adversary can identify that the association between u and a specific seg-
ment s ∈ SPZ has higher probability than 1/SPZ . In order to capture such vulnerability





in which ps denotes the probability that an adversary can infer user’s association with
segment s in privacy zone PZ. The Entropy is a measure of the amount of information
require to break the indistinguishability provided by the system. Adversary apply one of
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the attack model to calculate association probabilities of each segment in the privacy zone
by estimating the likelihood of user to pass each segment like[s]. Under this model, the





In this section we provide attack models that adversary may apply in order to find like-
lihoods of each segment in the privacy zone based on his prior knowledge. Background
knowledge considered in this work includes (1) the underlying road network, (2) all users
location recordings except while they are in the privacy zone, and (3) privacy zones de-
fined by each user. Note that with sufficient observation, attacker can identify user privacy
profile. For example, from the adversary perspective if the user’s location always block
when the user is nearby the hospitals attacker can infer that the user specified health-care
buildings as private. Also, by observing enter and exit point he can identify the range of the
privacy zone. In this attack models we consider the worst case scenario where the attacker
have access users’ locations while they are not in the privacy zone with high frequency that
they can identify each consecutive segments. We below describe three types of attacks:
(1) Timing Attack, (2) Minimum Travel Time-based Attack, and (3) Markov Model-based
Transition Attack.
Timing Attack
In timing attack, for the privacy zone PZ, the attacker observes the user time of entry tin
and the time of exit tout from border nodes bin and bout, respectively. He assigns one to
likelihood of the segments that are reachable in the time period between times of entry and
exit to the privacy zone (i.e., tout− tin). If the segment is not reachable, than he assigns 0
to the segments likelihood:
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Figure 5.6: Minimum Travel Time-based Attack
like[si] =

1, if tout − tin ≥ dtt(bin, si, bout)
0, otherwise
in which dtt(bin, si, bout)) defines the minimum time required for the mobile object to
travel from the border node bin to the border node bout with the path that includes segment
si. This time is the sum of the travel time distance from bin to start node of the segment,
segment travel time, and travel time distance from segment end node to the bout. For two
way segments we also need to consider shortest paths that visit segments end node first.
Formally;
dtt(bin, si, bout)) = min(
dtt(Lbin, L(si, 0)) + dtt(L(si, length(si)), Lbout),




Minimum Travel Time-based Attack
In this attack model, the attacker assumes that mobile users prefers to use the path with
minimum travel time. Based on this assumption and background knowledge of users tra-
jectory before and after he enters the privacy zone, attacker identify segments weather there
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is an alternative path that may lead to a lower travel time in order to reach certain segments.
Likelihood assigned for each segment based on the similarity of the travel time. Note that
in this attack model we used travel time similarity instead of path similarity, because in
urban setting it is possible to have multiple routes that leads to have similar travel times
(e.g., areas like Manhattan, NY). Figure 5.6 shows an example scenario. Assume that blue
line indicates user trajectory that enters to a privacy zone from north and exits from the
south. It is clear that the likelihood of user to visit east side of the privacy zone is minimal.
The attacker, first, identifies the longest path Pathbefore taken by a user before he
enters the privacy zone from the border node bin that has minimum travel time. Start-
ing from the segment that bin resides on, one add segments from user trajectory until the
shortest path from new segment’s end node to the border node does not match with the
user trajectory. Similarly attacker identify the longest path taken by user after he exits the
privacy zone from border node bout. Supposed that Lstart is the start location of the path
Pathbefore and Lend is the end location fo the path Pathafter. Attacker then calculates
two shortest path from Lstart to Lend that includes si; with and without the condition to
pass through bin and bout. The likelihood of segment si is calculated as a ratio between
two path’s travel time;
like[si] =
dtt(Lstart, si, Lend)
dtt(Pathbefore) + dtt(bin, si, bout) + dtt(Pathafter)
Markov Model-based Transition Attack
In this attack model, the attacker estimates the transition probability for each segment based
on his previous observation over all users travel pattern. It uses a simple Markov model to
make a probabilistic predictions of the mobile objects visited segments in the privacy zone
by looking at a drivers’ driven path before and after the privacy zone. The model is trained
from the all users’ long term trip history. Figure 5.7 shows a sketch of this basic approach.
We model the sequence of segments taken by user as st, with t representing a discrete time
variable.
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Figure 5.7: Markov model-based transition attack
Pathbefore{stin−n, ..., stin−2, stin−1}
Pathbefore{stout+1, stout+2, ..., stout+n}
The likelihood of segment si is calculated as probabilistic prediction based on other
users taken same paths.
like[si] = P [si]|stin−1, stin−2, ..., stin−n] + P [si]|stout+1, stout+2, ..., stout+n]
5.3 Privacy Zone Processing
The focus of this work is to develop a privacy zone enforcement model that minimize
latency, mobile client energy consumption, and the network usage while providing scalable
service large number of mobile object. First, we describe two basic methods and analyze
their problems. Then we introduce two models, hibernation-period and hibernation-region,
which improves privacy zone monitoring efficiency significantly.
5.3.1 Motivating Approaches
Request Dependent Processing: In this method, each location access intercepted by the
PrivacyZone client is evaluated by checking if the user is in any privacy zone or not. Even
though this approach provide privacy guarantee, since it delays the response for location
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access requests it affects user experience. In addition for applications that require high
frequent location update this approach can be extremely energy inefficient.
Periodic Processing: In an alternative approach it is possible to conduct periodic pri-
vacy zone checking. With this method location access request responded immediately
based on the last privacy zone check. However, high frequency is essential in this ap-
proach to ensure that location requests by the applications are permitted while the user in
the privacy zone.
Note that given methods are not flexible to share privacy zone processing between client
and server. Each privacy zone check should be employ on either client side or server side.
However, client-only approach suffer with high battery consumption. On the other hand
server-only approach introduce high network usage and latency in addition to be vulner-
ability against Man-in-the-Middle attack. Also, with given methods privacy zone check
should be employ even the user is very far from the any privacy zone. To overcome these
problems we present two hibernation distance-based privacy zone monitoring approaches
that can efficiently orchestrate client and server computations. The idea is as follows; the
server calculates hibernation distance, either in time based or region based, that guarantees
client will not be in any privacy zone within given distance. Hibernation distance-based
monitoring can reduce the frequency of wake-ups and increase sleep time of mobile clients
and minimize the computation cost of privacy zone checks by filtering out those zones that
are irrelevant or far away from the current location of the mobile object.
5.3.2 Hibernation Period-Based Monitoring
The first hibernation distance-based monitoring approach is hibernation period which com-
putes the time period during which the mobile client can continue to sleep without missing
any of her privacy zones. We compute this hibernation period using the distance from cur-
rent location of the mobile client to all border nodes of her privacy zones and the possible
speed limit of the mobile client. We consider Euclidean distance and road network distance
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(a) Euclidean (b) Road Network
Figure 5.8: Euclidean vs Road Network Shortest Path-based Hibernation Period
as two alternative distance function. The Road Network Distance measure offers a more
accurate estimate of the distance from a mobile clients current location to the spatial region
of the privacy zone, but it introduces additional overhead with expensive graph processing.
Euclidean distance-based hibernation period
For mobile object m, upon the expiration of its hibernation time, m wakes up and con-
tacts the PrivacyZone server to obtain its new hibernation time. The server first retrieves
the index of all privacy zones border nodes. Then the PrivacyZone server computes the
Euclidean distance between the current location of m and each of the border points for
all privacy zones and selects the border point that is the nearest to the current location
of m, denoted by bnearest, and calculates the new hibernation time for m based on the
Euclidean distance and a maximum speed (Vmax). Although using the global maximum
speed is too pessimistic to calculate hibernation time, it provide privacy guarantee by en-
suring that in the given time period mobile object can not reach any privacy zone. The
end time of the new hibernation time for m based on Euclidean distance-based method
using the global maximum speed is defined as currenttime+ DE(m,bnearest)
Vmax
in which
DE(m, bnearest) is the Euclidean distance between m and the bnearest. The object m
will be in the sleep mode during the above hibernation time.
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Figure 5.9: Euclidean lower bound-based filtering
Although the Euclidean distance-based hibernation period approach is simple to imple-
ment, assuming random way-point model and global maximum velocity limit leads to un-
derestimate the hibernation time. Consequently, mobile objects need to wake up frequently,
making PrivacyZone consuming higher battery than necessary. For example, Figure 5.8a
shows closest border nodes selected for two mobile objects m1 and m2. Since border
selection does not consider underlying road network, calculated hibernation period form2
to reach closest border node b22 is much shorter than the actual travel distance that mobile
object needs to take.
Road Network distance-based hibernation period
In this approach, in order to provide better hibernation period estimation we consider un-
derlying road network constraint which use Dijkstra’s network expansion algorithm [60].
Similar to Euclidean distance based approach when a mobile object m wakes up for each
privacy zone, the set of border points obtained. PrivacyZone server takes the current lo-
cation of m and each border point as input to calculate the travel time-based shortest
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path using Dijkstra’s network expansion algorithm. The shortest path having the small-
est travel time-based distance chosen to compute the new hibernation period form. Figure
5.8b shows shortest paths calculated for mobile objectsm1 andm2 to their closest border
nodes.
The network expansion-based approach is easy to implement, but the computation cost
is very high because of the expensive shortest path computation for each border nodes
of user’s privacy zones. To minimize shortest-path computation we use Euclidean Lower
Bound (ELB) [17] to filter out some border points that are not possible to be the shortest
network distance. The idea is travel time-based shortest path distance between two location
L1 and L2 is at least equal to or longer than the minimum possible travel time calculated
with the Euclidean distance divided by the global speed limit. In this approach, instead of
computing shortest paths from the current location Lm of the mobile object m to every
border point of all privacy zones defined bym, starting from the closest border node based
on Euclidean distance PrivacyZone server computes shortest paths until the distance can be
reach with minimum travel time and global maximum speed is smaller than the Euclidean
distance to the remaining border nodes. As shown in Figure 5.9, after calculating shortest
path travel time tsleep to a border node b11 it is not necessary to calculate shortest paths for
those border nodes (e.g., b34) whose distance to mobile object is larger than it can reach
even moving with the maximum speed limit vmax.
Hybrid hibernation period calculation
Euclidean-based approach calculate hibernation period faster than road-network-based ap-
proach, however it generates lower hibernation time.Calculation time in road network ap-
proach increase drastically while the distance between mobile object and border nodes
increase. Additionally, when the closest border node is far from the object location, we
may not leverage from the Euclidean Lower Bound optimization. In the hybrid approach
we optimize the calculation time to generate hibernation period for a road network-based
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processing by limiting the distance between mobile object and the closest border node. We
use alpha, system defined parameter, as an Euclidean distance limit from mobile object
to the closest border node to calculate shortest path travel time.
5.3.3 Hibernation Region-Based Monitoring
The hibernation period model is simple to implement and it provides minimal overhead for
mobile object, however it introduce more wake-ups than necessary because of two main
reasons. First, it assumes that users are moving all the time. However, mobile users may
stay at certain point for a long time and even though user is not getting closer to any privacy
zone it needs to send location update to the server at the end of the hibernation period.
Second, assuming user will move with speed limit for each segment is an overestimate and
cause unnecessary location updates. In order to overcome these limitations we presents
hibernation region model, in which hibernation distance is defined as an area instead of
time. Mobile objects only send their location update to the server when they move out of the
hibernation region. We show that this approach enables controlled distribution of privacy
zone processing load between the server and mobile objects. Such distributed processing
can significantly enhance server scalability with nominal resource consumption at the client
end. Note that we use hibernation period model in mobile client for area-based evaluation,
which minimize number of wake-ups in mobile client as well.
The main idea underlying our distributed architecture design is twofold. First, we want
to use the concept of hibernation region to reduce the amount of unnecessary privacy zone
checks as the mobile objects travel on the road. Second, we promote the distribution of
hibernation region-based privacy zone monitoring by the mobile clients; each mobile client
determines by itself whether it has moved outside its hibernation region without requiring
global knowledge of relevant privacy zones. An immediate advantage of our distributed
architecture is significant savings in terms of server load and communication bandwidth.
The main challenge in the design of our distributed architecture is the development of hiber-
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nation region computation techniques that can provide a careful trade-off between server
load and client energy consumption by taking into account: (i) the bandwidth required to
communicate the safe region from the server to its corresponding mobile client, and (ii)
the computation cost at a mobile client for monitoring its position with respect to the hi-
bernation region. In summary, hibernation region computation must satisfy the following
constraints:
Lightweight construction, The hibernation region computation should induce a low
processing overhead at the server as this compuation may need to be performed frequently
for large number of mobile objects.
Compact representation, The hibernation region should have a compact representa-
tion as it needs to be communicated back to the user resulting in consumption of network
bandwidth.
Fast containment check, Mobile users need to monitor their position the hibernation
region frequently. A simple and fast containment check will enable the clients to perform
this function with low energy consumption.
Large area coverage, Generated hibernation region should be as large as possible in
order to minimize location update requirements.
These requirements motivate us to design two alternative hibernation region techniques
and study the impact of size and shape of region on server load, network bandwidth and
client energy consumption.
Shortest Distance-based Hibernation Region
In the simplest hibernation region, the area is determined based on the closest border node.
Similar to the Euclidean hibernation period computation, PrivacyZone finds the closest
border node and send the distance, dhib to the mobile client. For each containment check,
mobile client calculate the distance dcurrent between the last location send to the server


































Figure 5.10: Shortest Distance vs Rectangle-shaped Hibernation Region
distance is lower than the hibernation distance (i.e., dcurrent < dhib). Note that, instead
of expensive Haversine formula we assume embedding on the plane, which [61] shows
that error is negligible . Figure 5.10 shows an example hibernation region for user m,
calculated based on the closest border node b23.
The shortest distance-based hibernation region satisfies lightweight construction, com-
pact representation, and fast containment check requirements. However, it suffers with the
relatively small area coverage, which leads to unnecessary location update.
Rectangle-based Hibernation Region
In order to minimize location update we propose simple and effective rectangle-based hi-
bernation region generation method. As shown in Figure 5.10 generated rectangle-shaped
hibernation region can cover much more area yet it provides minimal computation require-
ment for containment check on the mobile devices. In order to maximize the time user
stays in the hibernation region we use an approach with guarantees the distance between
a mobile object and the closest edge of the selected rectangle is to be the maximum. To
this end until one find all the edges of the rectangle by in each step selecting the closest
border node, choose the x or y axis of the node as an edge that has largest distance to the
user and eliminate all the remaining points further from selected axis. Figure 5.11 shows
the process step by step. First it selects closest border node bn1 and calculates the distance
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(a) Locations of mobile object and border
nodes
(b) Step˙1 (c) Step˙2
(d) Step˙3 (e) Step˙4
Figure 5.11: Calculating rectangle shape hibernation region
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(a) Atlanta (b) Duluth (c) Helen
Figure 5.12: Road networks used in experiments
Table 5.1: Road network properties.
map type number of segments number of junctions avg. segment length (m)
Atlanta urban 9,187 6,976 150.7
Duluth suburban 1,600 1,486 258.3
Helen rural 765 711 356.3
from mobile object to x-axis (dx)and y-axis (dy) of the border node. Since dy > dx,
y-axis of the bn1 selected as the lowest y value of the rectangle and the nodes that has
lower y values eliminated for further consideration. The process continues until it finds all
the edges of the rectangle.
5.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance of our PrivacZone methods through set of
experiments. We provide performance comparison between algorithms described in section
5.3.
5.4.1 Evaluation Setup
We use gt-mobisim simulator [18] to generate mobility traces on real road networks down-
loaded from U.S. Geological Survey 4. We used three different types of road networks,
Atlanta,GA, Duluth,GA, and Helen,GA as a urban, suburban, and a rural road network
4http://www.usgs.gov/
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respectively (See Figure 5.12 and Table 5.1). All three road networks cover almost the
same size, 11 km ( 6.8 miles) by 14 km (8.7 miles), but have totally different number of
road segments and road junctions. We use Atlanta map as a default road network in our
experiments.
The road networks consist of four different road types: residential roads and freeway
interchange with 30 mph speed limit (48 km/h), highway with 55 mph limit (89 km/h) and
freeway with 70 mph limit (113 km/h). The urban road network has 431 and 681 road
segments having 70 mph and 55 mph speed limit respectively. The other road segments
have 30 mph speed limit. 24 and 218 road segments of the suburban road network have 70
mph and 55 mph as their speed limit respectively. The rural road network has 27 and 66
road segments having 70 mph and 55 mph speed limit respectively.
In our experiments we use 20,000 mobility traces generated on three maps using the
random trip model [62]. As a default, nine privacy zones generated for each user. Ranges of
privacy zones are chosen from a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 500 m and standard
deviation of 100 m. For hybrid approach default alpha value selected as 1000 m. All
experiments were conducted on a desktop having one Intel i7-4790K quad-core processor,
16GB of RAM, and one 1TB 7200 rpm hard disk.
5.4.2 Experimental Results
We measure the performance of all approaches on different evaluation metrics; number of
the location update to the server, average hibernation time, number of wake up on mobile
device, and server/mobile processing time.
Effect of growing number of privacy zones and privacy zone size
The first set of experiments compares given approaches with respect to different number of
privacy zones per person and different privacy zone ranges.
Hibernation time. Figure 5.13 shows the average hibernation time of moving objects.
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Figure 5.13: Hibernation time comparison
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Figure 5.14: Number of wake-up comparison
The longer the hibernation time is, the more energy the mobile clients can conserve. The
hibernation time of the shortest path-based filter is two times longer than that of the Eu-
clidean distance based approach using the global maximum speed and more than three
times longer than the Rectangle-shaped hibernation region model. The reason of the low
hibernation time for rectangle-shaped hibernation region model is that after the sleep time
ends this model needs to consider closest points on the rectangle is a possible border node
location. This results also shows as expected that increasing the number privacy zones and
growing privacy zone range decrease hibernation time. The effect of new privacy zone is
larger than the increment on size of the privacy zone, since it increase the chance of the
new border nodes to be closer to mobile object.
The number of wake-ups. Figure 5.14 shows that the number of wake-ups is inversely
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Figure 5.15: Number of location update to the server comparison
related to the hibernation time. For hibernation period-based monitoring approaches, the
smaller number of wake-ups indicates the lower server loads since the server computes the
hibernation time whenever a moving object wakes up. On the other hand, for hibernation
region-based approaches, as the number of wake-ups increase both mobile and server loads
increase, because after each wake-up if the user still in the hibernation region mobile side
computes new hibernation time, otherwise it computed at the server side.
Number of location update to the server. Whenever mobile object wake up after
the hibernation period end or exit from the hibernation zone, sends his new location to
the server for new hibernation period/region calculation. Figure 5.15 shows the average
number of location update send to the server during each users trajectory with respect to
number of privacy zones and the size of each privacy zone, respectively. Note that, while
hibernation period-based methods sends location update to the server after each wake-
up, hibernation region based approaches calculates new hibernation time within client if
the mobile object still locates in the hibernation region. Also, since the area coverage is
larger than the circle-based approach, rectangle-based monitoring provide lowest network
usage. It is important to point that, our trajectory generator does not reflects real-world user
stops at certain locations or traffic waits. In real-world environment as the time user stops
increase the difference between hibernation region and hibernation period models would
also increase.
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Figure 5.16: Server side processing time comparison
Server side computation. Figure 5.16 shows the server side processing load for cal-
culating the hibernation period or the hibernation region. Average computation time for
single location update presented in Figures 5.16a and 5.16b and total computation time for
single user presented in Figures 5.16c and 5.16d. Compared to euclidean-based calcula-
tions, IER shows at least four times higher average computation time caused by expensive
shortest-path calculation. As expected hibernation region approaches provide lower over-
all server load because of the low location update. Note that all approaches except IER
require more time to calculate hibernation period/regions as the number of privacy zone
increase. Because, as the nearest border node getting closer, Euclidean lower bound tech-
nique become more effective. Another important result is that even tough rectangle-based
monitoring approach require more time to calculate hibernation region than the circle-based
approach since the number of location update is low, total server load is similar between
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Figure 5.17: Client side processing time comparison
this approaches.
Client side computation. Figure 5.17 shows the mobile side processing load for check-
ing if the user is still in the hibernation region and if so calculating the new hibernation time.
Note that only hibernation region-based monitoring approach requires mobile side process-
ing. For the comparison we use request dependent processing approach for checking if the
user is in any of his privacy zone. In this experiment we used 30 sec as the frequency of
location request. As expected even for low frequency request dependent approach is not
viable solution for current mobile environments.
Privacy protection evaluation
With this set of experiments we evaluate the effectiveness of attack models introduced in
Section 5.2.6. Figure 5.18a shows entropy values calculated for different size of privacy
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Figure 5.18: Privacy protection
zones. As expected, the strength of the privacy zone is directly proportional to the number
of segment covered by privacy zone. Since the trajectory generator used in our experiments
does not reflect mobile users stops or slowdowns, timing attack shows better attack strength
then the minimum travel time distance-based attack model. Among there attack model
Markov Model-based transition attack outperforms other attack models as it predicts user
future locations more effectively. We propose to use timing attack as an additional check for
other attack models in order to eliminate assigning probabilities for segments that user can
not be reached. In order to validate the correctness of entropy values, we compare assigned
probabilities of each segment on the original trajectory. Our accuracy test in Figure 5.18b
shows correlated result with the entropy.
Effect of different road networks
This set of experiments measure the performance of given privacy zone monitoring ap-
proaches using different types of road networks. Figure 5.19 shows the experimental re-
sults for the urban (Atlanta), suburban (Duluth) and rural (Helen) area road networks. The
result confirms that as the number of shortest-path computation increase performance of
IER approach gets worse. With respect to hibernation time and number of wake-ups the
rectangle-based hibernation region monitoring approach is the most sensitive to road net-
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Figure 5.19: Effect of different road networks
work structure. As the distance increase between roads with rectangle-based approach the
chance of stating in the hibernation region increase more than other approaches.
Deciding the right alpha value
In hybrid hibernation-period monitoring approach we aim to provide optimal balance be-
tween Euclidean and IER models. With this set of experiments we showed the effect of
selected alpha value. Figure 5.20 shows that for increasing alpha for low values (250 m
to 1000 m) has significant effect on hibernation time but does not increase server side pro-
cessing time. Based on this results we used 1000 meter as a default alpha values for our
experiments.
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This thesis center around designing, building, and deployment privacy-aware services in the
Internet of Things environment. We have presented orchestration framework, called ISYM-
PHONY, aiming at scaling real-time and on-demand IoT services provisioning in large scale
IoT systems. A main idea behind our distributed IoT orchestration architecture is the intel-
ligent partition of a real time IoT services provisioning task into an optimal coordination
of server-side processing at IoT gateway and client-side process at edge clients running on
edge devices. We also develop a road network-based partitioning mechanism that consid-
ers the density of each segment in order to minimize the number of inter-partition changes.
In addition, we employ a set of optimizations to limit the amount of unnecessary process-
ing on edge gateway side (object side) to enhance the overall performance and resource
utilization of the ISYMPHONY system. Our initial experiments show that ISYMPHONY
offers significant savings in terms of server load and thus improving server throughput by
leveraging and coordinating the object side processing capabilities on edge gateways, com-
pared to the solutions relying solely on server level processing for real time IoT services
provisioning.
We have presented Foggy framework that offers an automated IoT application deploy-
ment and update model in order to provide optimal resource management in heteroge-
neous IoT environments. We identified several requirements in common IoT applications.
Latency-sensitivity, dynamic workload, resource constraints and heterogeneity of the IoT
devices, bandwidth consumption, and privacy preservation are the main constraints that we
have taken into consideration during the design of our orchestration framework. As a proof
of concept we implemented a prototype of Foggy and deployed it to a cluster of Raspberry
Pi boards. Note that this work is the initial development of our IoT application deployment
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framework. There are several research work that we plan to further improve our system.
First of all, we are planning to extend our prototype for a large-scale real-wold IoT appli-
cation. Another research direction is to improve our policy-based resource management
procedure with optimization techniques. The goal of such optimization techniques is not
only optimal container placement on the nodes but also to support scalability for thousands
of nodes and several applications with multiple container sequences. As a future direction
also, we are planning to put in place a machine learning component that can learn from the
behavior of the different deployed applications and recommend some requirements adjust-
ment in certain context changes.
In this dissertation research we also provide privacy-preserving models and algorithms
for IoT systems. First we have presented StarCloak, a query utility-aware and attack-
resilient location anonymization technique for mobile users travels on the road network.
StarCloak generate cloak regions with strong privacy-preserving grantee while minimize
additional costs (latency and communication overhead) introduced by anonymization. Sec-
ond, we propose new privacy preserving system, PrivacyZone, for the current mobile ap-
plications. The goal of the project is to hide user location in the user specified quarantine
areas with minimal overhead and privacy guarantee.
6.1 Future Directions
There are many interesting open research problems for the context of Internet of Things
from various perspectives.
First of all, in ISymphony we considered a random way-point model for the range
queries. However, in real world mobile objects are mostly interested in the road network
distance of other objects. As the mobile object has limited capacity to process road network
based queries, it is important to develop novel approach to minimize energy consumption
on the mobile devices. We are also planning to develop advance road network partitioning
mechanism that can further improve our overall system performance.
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There are also several research work that we plan to further improve our IoT application
deployment framework Foggy. We are planning to extend our prototype for a large-scale
real-wold IoT application. Another research direction is to improve our policy-based re-
source management procedure with optimization techniques. The goal of such optimization
techniques is not only optimal container placement on the nodes but also to support scal-
ability for thousands of nodes and several applications with multiple container sequences.
As a future direction also, we are planning to put in place a machine learning component
that can learn from the behavior of the different deployed applications and recommend
some requirements adjustment in certain context changes.
Finally, for PrivacyZone in order to minimize server/mobile processing loads we are
planning to develop motion-aware hibernation region calculation mechanisms that consid-
ers the direction of the mobile object to maximize the time user stay in the hibernation
region. In addition, we are planning to develop dynamic privacy zone creation techniques
that can generate more compact privacy zones on fly with the same privacy guarantee. Also,
since PrivacyZone is a new concept for location privacy protection, it is worth to investigate
more sophisticated attack models.
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